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 Nietzsche has often been interpreted as the champion of heroic, self-sufficient 
individuals, who manage to fashion some order out of the raw material of Nature 
through the exercise of free will.  On the face of things, Nietzsches doctrine of eternal 
recurrence creates a problem for such an interpretation.  If history must eternally repeat 
itself, then it can take only one possible route.  Individuals future actions would then be 
constrained by the sole possible path of history, and free will would seem to be 
undermined. 
In order to avoid the conclusion that eternal recurrence obviates free will, 
scholars have attempted to show that: (1) Nietzsche does not wish to establish a link 
between eternal recurrence and cosmologythat is, eternal recurrence should not be 
read as the cyclical repetition of history; (2) eternal recurrence can be construed so that it 
aggrandizes the importance of free choice.  Contrary to these two trends in scholarship 
about eternal recurrence, I believe that Nietzsche intends to draw a connection between 
eternal recurrence and cosmology, and this connection undermines free will.  In order to 
establish this, I examine the textual evidence on eternal recurrence from The Gay 
 iv
Science and Zarathustra to show that Nietzsche employs eternal recurrence as a 
metaphor for determinism in those works.  As a metaphor for a deterministic cosmos, 
eternal recurrence undercuts free will.  Turning to Nietzsches late works, I show that 
Nietzsche broadens the scope of eternal recurrence.  Eternal recurrence comes to serve 
as a metaphor for the Dionysian character of Nature.  Only by relinquishing ones desire 
for free will and submitting to necessity and to the trans-individual potency of Nature 
can the individual see herself as powerful.  Hence, it is argued that Nietzsche does not 
believe individuals manifest strength by asserting their free wills against Nature, as 
commentators often maintain.  Instead, Nietzsche enjoins individuals to cede their 
desires for free will and to participate in the trans-individual vitality of Nature. 
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In On The Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche concedes that Christianity has served 
at least one historically valuable and vital function.  It saved humanity from suicidal 
nihilism by interpreting suffering as Gods righteous punishment for sin.1  After raising 
humanitys guilt to a previously unparalleled pitch, Christianity provided a goal, an 
outlet for humanitys instinct to crueltynamely, self-torment.  As Nietzsche states, 
Guilt before God: this thought becomes an instrument of torture to [humanity].2  But 
Christianitys honesty, Nietzsche believes, will inevitably force it to confess Gods 
nonexistence.  After Christianitys subsequent self-annihilation, suffering will be left 
unexplained.  Nietzsche worries that the inexplicability of suffering might prove 
dangerous.  For What really arouses indignation against suffering is not suffering as 
such but the senselessness of suffering.3  At a loss to comprehend suffering in the wake 
of Gods death, humanity might be headed for the suicidal nihilism from which 
Christianity rescued it nearly two millennia earlier.  Nietzsches own educator, 
Schopenhauer, formulated a pessimistic architectonic aimed at providing an answer to 
                                                
This thesis follows the style and format of the Chicago Manual of Style. 
 
1 Suicidal nihilism can be distinguished from nihilism for Nietzsche. Christianity 
is certainly a form of nihilism, inasmuch as it deprecates becoming. However, it is not a 
form of suicidal nihilism, because it sustains humanitys will by providing it with the 
goal of self-torture. 
 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals  in On the Genealogy of 
Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, Random House: 1967), 92. 
 
3 Ibid., 67. 
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the problem of suffering.  He maintained that the preponderance of meaningless 
suffering in the world proves life to be a mistake.  The only prescription for existence, he 
argued, is self-annihilation.  While the young Nietzsche was seduced by his mentors 
doctrine of life-denial, the older Nietzsche sees it as an expression of decadence.  His 
mature philosophical endeavor is to illumine the path to life-affirmation.  He wishes to 
show how the individual can avoid the morass of Schopenhauerian self-resignation, 
instead embracing life in a world that is not inherently amenable to humanitys desires 
for comprehensibility and comfort.  How can the individual affirm life in the world of 
becoming?  This is the question for which Nietzsche believed Europe would need an 
answer after the inexorable failure of the Christian, ascetic interpretation of life.   
Nietzsches mature thinking about life-affirmation centers on his doctrine of 
eternal recurrence.  He believes that affirming eternal recurrence signifies the highest 
formula of affirmation that is at all attainable.4  Commentators have traditionally 
attempted to show three things about eternal recurrence.  The first is that it does not 
represent Nietzsches cosmology.  That is, Nietzsche does not believe that history 
cyclically recurs in precisely the same pattern.  If proven that Nietzsche does not 
propound a recurrence cosmology, this would arrest what Maudemarie Clark notes as 
the most common objection to eternal recurrence, namely, that we have no reason to 
accept its truth.5  In an effort to save Nietzsche from this criticism, Clark attempts to 
                                                
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce 
Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, Random House: 1967), 295. 
 
5 Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 245. 
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demonstrate that none of the passages in which Nietzsche discusses eternal recurrence 
commits him to a recurrence cosmology.  Similarly, in order to provide an account of 
eternal recurrence that is totally independent of physics, Alexander Nehamas interprets 
it as the following conditional: If anything in the world recurred, including an 
individual life or even a single moment within it, then everything in the world would 
recur in exactly the same fashion.6  Nehamas thereby avoids attributing to Nietzsche 
actual belief in the recurrence of history. 
The second concern of commentators has been to show that Nietzsche has good 
reason for linking eternal recurrence to life-affirmation.  Once the connection between 
eternal recurrence and physics has been severed, one might suspect that this is a difficult 
task to accomplish.  After all, if Nietzsche thinks that eternal recurrence does not provide 
an accurate depiction of reality, why would affirming it constitute an affirmation of life?  
Nehamas provides a plausible answer.  He begins by arguing that Nietzsche believes all 
events to be interconnected, such that no single event can be altered without the entire 
world changing.  Nehamas then claims that to desire eternal recurrence is [to] desire to 
repeat this very life, and so everything else in the world as well, [for] all eternity.7  The 
affirmer of eternal recurrence desires that this world, precisely as it has been and now 
exists, be repeated into eternity.  This would explain why Nietzsche sees eternal 
recurrence as the highest attainable affirmation of life.  For despite the unsatisfiability of 
                                                
6 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), 156. 
 
7 Ibid., 159. 
 4
the desire for recurrence, its existence bespeaks the individuals positive evaluative 
stance toward the only life, and only world, possible for her. 
The third interpretive trend has been to demonstrate that eternal recurrence does 
not obviate the traditional conception of individual freedom and strength.  Rather, it 
actually aggrandizes the importance of the free choices and actions of individuals.  By 
the traditional conception of individual freedom and strength, I intend the vision of the 
individual as a possessor of free will, who manifests her strength by imposing her will 
on reality.  If one interprets eternal recurrence literally, it seems intuitively plausible to 
think that it might contradict the traditional notion of human freedom.  For events in the 
future of ones present lifecycle have already been settled by the lone possible path of 
history.  It thus seems that one has no control over ones future.  Nehamas avoids this 
problem by refusing to interpret eternal recurrence literally.8  He proceeds to argue that 
Nietzsche intends to link eternal recurrence to a conception of the individual as the 
heroic, self-sufficient redeemer of history.  Nehamass interpretation of eternal 
recurrence relies heavily upon the section of Zarathustra titled On Redemption.  There 
Zarathustra states, All it was is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful accidentuntil the 
creative will says to it, But thus I willed it.  Until the creative will says to it, But thus I 
will it; thus shall I will it.9  The creative willing of the übermenschlich Nietzschean 
                                                
8 Lawrence Hatab, who does interpret eternal recurrence literally, nevertheless 
maintains that it does not contradict human freedom. I discuss this in the third chapter. 
See Lawrence Hatab, Nietzsches Life Sentence: Coming to Terms with Eternal 
Recurrence (New York: Routledge, 2005), 129. 
 
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All, trans. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York, Penguin Books: 1966), 139. 
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individual redeems the senselessness of those past events which previously stood outside 
her wills sphere of dominance.  So long as she creates, on the basis of the past, an 
acceptable future, [she] justif[ies] and redeem[s] everything that made this future 
possible.10  According to Nehamass interconnectivity thesis, everything that made 
this future possible is the past in its entirety, down to the minutest details.  Hence, 
Nehamas attests that absolutely everything in the past is redeemed for the affirmer of 
eternal recurrence.11  Nehamas thus sees the ideal Nietzschean life-affirmer as the 
individual who is capable of redeeming history through the creative activity of her own 
will.  
 My own interpretive strategy goes against the grain of the three trends discussed 
above.  First, I maintain that Nietzsche intends to draw a connection between eternal 
recurrence and cosmology.  While I remain agnostic concerning Nietzsches belief in the 
actual recurrence of history, I think eternal recurrence, at the very least, serves as a 
metaphor for the way reality actually is.  Second, affirming eternal recurrence 
constitutes the highest attainable affirmation of life, because eternal recurrence 
symbolizes the cosmos.  Finally, Nietzsche employs eternal recurrence to undermine the 
traditional conception of individual freedom, instead substituting a novel conception of 
what it means to be a powerful individual.  T.K. Seung provides a precedent for the 
heterodox interpretive approach to eternal recurrence that I take in this thesis.  By way of 
                                                
10 Nehamas, 160. 
 
11 Ibid., 161. 
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introduction to my own approach, delineating Seungs innovative contribution to the 
literature on eternal recurrence will prove fruitful. 
 Seungs interpretation of eternal recurrence emerges through his detailed 
narrative of Zarathustra.  The central motif of Nietzsches prized work, Seung argues, is 
the conflict between Zarathustras individual, or Faustian, self, and his cosmic, or 
Spinozan, self.  The Faustian self champions radical individualism12 and aspires to 
complete self-sufficiency.13  This is the heroic sort of individual, described by 
Nehamas, who redeems history through the exercise of her unique creative will.  The 
Faustian self attempts to assert its strength by posing its autonomous will against reality, 
or against cosmic necessity.  By autonomous will, Seung essentially intends what is 
usually captured by agent causal accounts of free will.14  According to such accounts, 
there are unseen forces that cause human actions.  These forces are agents, or human 
wills, that are somehow exempt from the deterministic laws governing the rest of the 
universe.  Agents have the capacity to make completely free, or undetermined, choices, 
and these free choices effectively cause observable actions.  In recent discussions of the 
free will issue, agent causation has come under heavy fire.  One important objection 
raised against it is that the agent it posits seems like a metaphysical entity, or a Cartesian 
                                                
12 T.K. Seung, Nietzsches Epic of the Soul: Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2005), 53. 
 
13 Ibid., 38. 
 
14 Ibid., 141. 
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ego.15  The agent is conceived as a sort of unmoved mover, residing mysteriously behind 
the actions of the human body and controlling them.  Opponents argue that agent 
causation is shoddy science.16  There is no reason to think that anything other than 
physical forces can cause empirically verifiable acts and events.  Like Seung, I will use 
the word autonomy in this paper to denote the kind of human freedom detailed by 
agent causal accounts.   
 Nietzsche is highly critical of agent causation for the precise reason highlighted 
above.  The very idea of causation, he attests, has been derived from the false belief that 
humans are causal agents in the act of willing.17  According to Nietzsche, there is no 
ego that can do the willing: And as for the ego!  It has become a fable, a fiction, a play 
on wordsWhat follows from this?  There are no spiritual causes at all!18  The theme 
that there is no being behind doingno metaphysical subject or ego behind actionruns 
throughout Nietzsches mature works.  The notion that a metaphysical subject freely 
causes actions, Nietzsche maintains, was invented for the dubious purpose of finding 
[people] guilty so that they might be held morally accountable.19  In fact, the Judeo-
                                                
15 Peter van Inwagen, Free Will Remains a Mystery in The Oxford Handbook 
of Free Will, Ed. Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 158. 
 
16 Ibid., 158. 
 
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols in Twilight Of The Idols and The 
Anti-Christ, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 60. It is not clear, 
however, that simply because the idea of causation was falsely derived, it is therefore 
false. 
  
18 Ibid., 60. 
 
19 Ibid., 64. 
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Christian moral-world-order depends on the notion of free will in order to justify 
itself.20  As soon as traditional morality ceases believing in the causally efficacious 
power of agents, there will be no ego to be blamed for its actions.  It will then be 
acknowledged that a naturalistic conception of the cosmos does not permit belief in a 
morally responsible subject behind actions and events. 
 Actions and events seem bound together in such a way that, according to 
Nietzsche, the result is determinism.  That Nietzsche wants eternal recurrence to 
function as a metaphor for cosmic necessity, at least in The Gay Science and 
Zarathustra, will be argued in the third chapter.  Cosmic necessity is, in turn, demanded 
by Nietzsches devotion to determinism.  Since Nietzsche often champions the creative, 
active individual, one might be suspicious of attributing to Nietzsche a deterministic 
view of the cosmos.  Determinism would, it seems, undermine Nietzsches praise of self-
stylization, for instance.  It may seem natural to think that there needs to be an 
undetermined, free self capable of arranging various natural drives and power centers 
in order for self-stylization to occur.  But what could this self be besides a metaphysical 
subject that stands somehow mysteriously behind the natural forces and drives that it 
organizes?  At present, I wish to provide evidence of Nietzsches belief in determinism 
in order to allay any prejudice the reader may have against thinking that Nietzsche takes 
determinism seriously.   
                                                
20 Ibid., 65. 
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As early as Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche writes, everything that happens 
is inseparably connected with everything that is going to happen.21  This statement 
constitutes a tacit rejection of any sort of libertarian free will.  For libertarian accounts of 
free will, including agent causation, maintain that current events are not inextricably 
bound to future events.  This is so because some future events will be the undetermined 
actions of individuals.  Because these future actions are undetermined, what happens at 
present does not necessarily have any bearing on them.  The only way that the present 
can be inseparably connected with everything in the future, as Nietzsche says it is, is if 
he holds to some version of determinism.  While Lawrence Hatab acknowledges 
Nietzsches denial of an agent-causal account of free will, he argues that Nietzsches 
position is compatible with an open future.22  Because Nietzsches understanding of 
necessity does not preclude the openness of the future, Hatab argues that Nietzsche does 
not hold to causal determinism.   
Hatab might be partially correct, insofar as Nietzsche does not adhere to causal 
determinism;23 but it does not follow from Nietzsches denial of causal determinism that 
he repudiates all forms of determinism.  Zarathustra teaches what appears to be 
Nietzsches brand of determinism when he proclaims, Have you ever said Yes to a 
single joy?  O my friends, then you have said Yes too to all woe.  All things are 
                                                
21 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. R.J. Hollingdale 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 97. 
 
22 Hatab, 133. 
 
23 It is not clear to me whether Nietzsche accepts or rejects it. 
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entangled, ensnared, enamored; if ever you wanted one thing twice, if ever you said, 
You please me, happiness!  Abide, moment! Then you wanted all back.24  Nehamas 
uses these passages and others to show that Nietzsche holds to an interconnectivity 
thesis.25  As mentioned above, according to this thesis, all events are inextricably linked, 
such that if one event changed the entire world would be different.  Nehamas does not 
consider whether the interconnectivity thesis commits Nietzsche to determinism.  
However, the sort of interconnectivity hinted at in Human, All-Too-Human and 
described by Zarathustra is what is now referred to as block-universe determinism.26  
This brand of determinism reflects the intuition that a difference anywhere in the 
universe requires a difference everywhere.27  Block-universe determinism posits that 
every action is necessitated by everything else in the universe that has existed and now 
exists.  Thus, the future is the inevitable result of all that is past.  While it is not clear that 
Nietzsche believes in causal determinism, he does seem to hold to block-universe 
determinism.  This form of determinism is just as problematic for the traditional 
conception of human freedom as causal determinism.  If my next action is entailed by 
everything in the past, I can do nothing at present to change my course of action.  My 
action will be just as beyond my autonomous control as the flight of a stone is beyond 
the stones control.  When I argue in the third chapter that eternal recurrence is a 
                                                
24 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, 323. 
 
25 Nehamas, 154. 
 
26 Robert C. Bishop, Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will in The Oxford 
Handbook of Free Will, Ed. Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 113. 
 
27 Ibid., 114. 
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metaphor for determinism, I am referring to block-universe determinism.  The restriction 
on autonomous choice guaranteed by this type of determinism will prove identical to the 
restriction on freedom effected by eternal recurrence in The Gay Science and 
Zarathustra. 
 Most commentators, including Hatab and Nehamas, read eternal recurrence as 
perfectly compatible with the individuals future exercise of free choice.28  Seung holds 
a radically different thesis.  He argues that Zarathustra is ultimately unable to triumph 
over cosmic necessity through the assertion of his autonomous will.  Rather than 
successfully establishing his Faustian self as his true self, he must come to acknowledge 
that his cosmic, or Spinozan, self constitutes him.  This cosmic self is coextensive with 
cosmic necessity, or Nature.  It does not struggle to assert its autonomy against the 
cosmos, but rather acknowledges that it belongs to necessity.  In keeping with the 
science of Nietzsches time,29 Seung conceives Nature on a mechanistic model.  The 
autonomous, Faustian self must eventually confess his impotence and submit to Nature.  
Naturally, shaking off the Faustian interpretation of the self is difficult.  Viewing 
ourselves as autonomous agents has allowed us to see ourselves as exceedingly 
important and powerful.  While Nature follows laws from which it cannot stray, we 
                                                
28 See Nehamas, 160-161; Hatab, 129. Both Nehamas and Hatab realize that 
Nietzsche does not endorse agent causation. However, they maintain that Nietzsche does 
not think the way we talk about human freedom needs to change after rejecting agent 
causation. Hence, they continue to talk about individual choice and activity as if 
Nietzsche is not concerned to radically revise our thinking about those notions. I will 
argue, on the contrary, that he does propose a radical revision. 
 
29 I do not mean to imply that present day science has advanced beyond 
mechanistic explanations at the macro level.  
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think we have a power found nowhere in Nature apart from us; that is, the power to be 
the uncaused causes of actions and events.  Thinking that we can wield this power makes 
us believe that we have a measure of control over the forces of Nature.  But eternal 
recurrence, according to Seung, functions as a metaphor that forces Zarathustra to 
acknowledge his autonomous wills inability to assert itself against Nature.  For eternal 
recurrence is probably no more than a poetic parable for describing a deterministic 
universe.30  Zarathustras struggle with eternal recurrence is his battle with the idea that 
his life, like everything else in Nature, is nothing but the denouement of natural forces.  
Affirming eternal recurrence must involve relinquishing his claim to autonomy and 
embracing his status as a fully natural, fully determined being.   
 Seungs interpretive strategy has two advantages over any of the commentators 
strategies mentioned thus far.  First, Seung is able to provide a direct account of why 
Nietzsche links affirming eternal recurrence to life-affirmation.  He can do so because 
eternal recurrence is a metaphor for the way the world actually is.  The other 
commentators can only connect eternal recurrence to life-affirmation once they have 
settled upon some suitable formulation of it.  Both Clark and Nehamas start with the 
premise that eternal recurrence cannot possibly have anything to do with cosmology.  
Their accounts of eternal recurrence thus begin with sustained efforts to show that 
Nietzsche does not endorse a recurrence cosmology.  Only afterwards do they attempt to 
formulate eternal recurrence in such a way that it still makes sense as Nietzsches ideal 
of life-affirmation.  This strategy seems somewhat contrived when compared to Seungs.  
                                                
30 Seung, 180. 
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Second, Seungs strategy accounts for Nietzsches disdain for the ego and the concept of 
free will.  If Nietzsche truly repudiates free will, then any view of eternal recurrence that 
sees affirming it as the greatest manifestation of an individuals autonomous strength 
seems, prima facie, likely to be misguided.   
Because Seungs work is a comprehensive narrative of Zarathustra, he deals 
only with passages from that work.  In this thesis, I will examine all the textual evidence 
on eternal recurrence in an effort to construct a comprehensive interpretation of eternal 
recurrence very much like Seungs reading.  Nietzsche, so I will argue, sees affirming 
eternal recurrence as the highest possible affirmation of life, because eternal recurrence 
serves as a metaphor for Nature.  Furthermore, affirming eternal recurrence does not 
require a seemingly superhuman act of individual strength.  Instead, Nietzsche intends 
for the initial effect of eternal recurrence to bring the individual low.  In The Gay 
Science and Zarathustra, this effect is achieved because eternal recurrence functions as a 
metaphor for determinism.  It thereby forces the individual to realize that she has no free 
will by which to assert herself against the forces of Nature or the accidents of history 
engendered by the interplay of those forces.  In Nietzsches late works, the metaphorical 
significance of eternal recurrence is extended beyond determinism to the Dionysian 
character of Nature.  What I mean by Dionysian character of Nature will become 
clearer in the fourth chapter.  At present, I will note a few aspects of Dionysian Nature 
that will receive textual explication later in the thesis.  First, Nature is ateleological.  
That is, Natures cyclical activity of bringing creatures into existence and stamping them 
out lacks any intrinsic directionality.  Second, Nature is not inherently rational or moral.  
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Third, like Heraclituss conception of the cosmos, Nature is essentially agonistic, that is, 
defined by strife and conflict.  Fourth, each element within the total economy of Nature 
is necessary.  Thus, life cannot exist apart from the elements of Nature that have 
traditionally been eliminated from heavenly realms by religious interpretations of life
elements such as death, suffering, and decay.  Finally, Nature is a trans-individual force 
(or collection of forces).  Affirming eternal recurrence requires that the individual submit 
to Nature.  Through confessing ones autonomous impotence and acknowledging 
Natures virility, the individual is resurrected and enabled to participate in the Dionysian 
power of Nature.  As Nietzsche puts it, the individual experiences in herself the eternal 
joy of becoming.31  The ideal Nietzschean life-affirmer thus eschews the notion that her 
capacity to impose her individual will upon Nature showcases her strength.  Instead, she 
sees her power as a product of her immersion in Nature. 
The outline of the remainder of the thesis is as follows.  In the second chapter, I 
will turn to The Birth of Tragedy to examine how Nietzsche attempts to justify life in his 
first work.  I try to show some important similarities and dissimilarities between his 
early attempt at life-justification and his late attempt at life-affirmation.  In the third 
chapter, I survey the textual evidence concerning eternal recurrence in The Gay Science 
and Zarathustra.  My aim is to demonstrate that eternal recurrence functions as a 
metaphor for determinism in those works.  Several of my interpretations of passages 
from Zarathustra owe heavily to Seung, while others are original.  I have tried to give 
Seung credit where deserved.  The analysis provided in the third chapter shows that 
                                                
31 Nietzsche, Twilight, 121. 
 15
Nietzsche thinks the deterministic consequences of eternal recurrence are incredibly 
tough to stomach.  For determinism enervates the individuals drive to self-sufficiency 
by obviating her capacity to triumphantly rectify the accidents entailed by cosmic 
necessity.  In the fourth chapter, I show that Nietzsche broadens the scope of eternal 
recurrence in his late works.  Eternal recurrence comes to function as a metaphor for the 
Dionysian character of Nature.  Nietzsche hopes that, by affirming eternal recurrence, 
the individual can experience in herself Dionysian Natures vitality.  In the fifth and final 
chapter, I will attempt to show what Nehamass interpretation of eternal recurrence, 






























LIFE-JUSTIFICATION IN THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY 
 
In his 1886 Attempt at a Self-Criticism, Nietzsche announces that in his first 
work, The Birth of Tragedy, he had already considerably distanced himself from 
Schopenhauers resignationism.32  For Schopenhauer, tragedys lucid portrayal of the 
insuperability of the suffering and conflict entailed by individuated existence reinforces 
his doctrine of self-denial.  Tragedy, writes Schopenhauer,  
is the description of the terrible side of life.  The unspeakable pain, the 
wretchedness and misery of mankind, the triumph of wickedness, the scornful 
mastery of chance, and the irretrievable fall of the just and the innocent are all 
here presented to us; and here is to be found a significant hint as to the nature of 
the world and of existence.33   
  
The hint provided by tragedy is that the splintering of the will, the thing in itself, into a 
multiplicity of phenomenal individuals is an error for which only self-resignation, and 
ultimately death, can atone.  For Schopenhauer, then, tragedy is most immediately a 
descriptive art displaying the dissonance of existence.  But its highest function consists 
in its capacity to engender the spectators recognition of the proper prescription for 
existence, the annihilation of self.  In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche seems to accept 
the Schopenhauerian description of reality disclosed by tragedy.  He attests that tragedy 
                                                
32 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy in The Birth of Tragedy and The 
Case of Wagner, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), 24. 
 
33 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E.F.J. 
Payne (New York: Dover, 1969), 1: 252-3. 
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offers a profoundly pessimistic view of the world34 and that the state of individuation 
is the origin and primal cause of all suffering.35  However, Nietzsche does not wish to 
grant tragedy the prescriptive function afforded it by Schopenhauer.  Instead, his 
thematic purposes are to show how tragedy justifies life, as well as to inspire the rebirth 
of a tragic culture.  The justification of life elicited by tragedy, so Nietzsche hopes, will 
counteract Schopenhauers destructive philosophy of life-denial.   
 Nietzsche later came to acknowledge the complicity of his early thinking about 
life-justification in certain cultural infirmities he had aimed to cure.  Most prominently, 
he criticizes his first works dependence upon dialectic.  In his mature works, Nietzsche 
prefers to focus on themes such as the necessity of strife and conflict.  Hence, he 
eschews theoretical attempts to resolve the multitude of tensions endemic to an 
essentially agonistic world.  Naturally, he takes aim at Hegel.  It is largely because The 
Birth of Tragedy smells offensively Hegelian that Nietzsche condemns it.36  Unlike 
Hegel, Nietzsche had hoped to justify existence in a world in which dialectic and reason 
cannot triumph over the irreducible tensions portrayed by tragedy.  However, as 
Nietzsche later realized, it is unclear how the synthesis he attempts to invoke between 
Dionysus and Apollo contributes to the aesthetic justification of life, or to the formation 
of a tragic culture, that he wishes to envision.  My objective in this chapter is to explicate 
                                                
34 Nietzsche, Tragedy, 74. 
 
35 Ibid., 73. 
 
36 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo in On The Genealogy of Morals and Ecce 
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what Nietzsche may have had in mind.  Three themes that emerge from Nietzsches 
early thinking about life-justification will prove important, either as points of 
comparison or contrast, for understanding his later thinking about life-affirmation.  First, 
Dionysuss function as a symbol for the essentially conflicted nature of reality is 
important, for Dionysus in Nietzsches late works is largely similar to Dionysus in The 
Birth of Tragedy.  The only substantial difference is that Dionysus is closely tied to 
Schopenhauers metaphysical conception of the will as thing-in-itself in Nietzsches first 
work.  In his late works, Dionysus becomes naturalized.  Second, it is vital to see that 
Nietzsches depiction of tragedy, and by extension his justification of life, relies heavily 
on the catharsis evoked by the Apollonian principle.  Both Nussbaum and Schacht stress 
what they see as the continuity between the justification of life that Nietzsche offers in 
The Birth of Tragedy and his late thinking about life-affirmation.37  I, on the contrary, 
will maintain that Nietzsches need for Apollo in his early life-justificatory formula 
marks an important difference from his later attempt at a purely Dionysian affirmation of 
life.  Finally, I will briefly discuss how Nietzsche might have intended for his life-
justification to operate.  I will discuss the difference between life-justification and 
life-affirmation in order further to underscore the disparity between his early and late 
thinking about these issues.38 
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Idealism and the Death of Tragedy 
 Nietzsche, from the commencement of his philosophical career until its 
desuetude, expresses concern about his cultures propensity to view reality as perfectly 
amenable to rational interpretation.  This concern is central to his thinking about life-
affirmation at every stage of his life.  In his mature thought, Nietzsche associates faith in 
a rational order with the standpoint he calls idealism.  Idealism appears in variegated 
guisesas Platonism, Christianity, Hegelianism, will to truth, or scientific rationalism, 
among others.  Despite their more or less subtle differences, forms of idealism share a 
fundamental proclivity for positing an ideal, intelligible realm as true reality.  Idealists 
endow their fabricated realms with the traits of being over against those of becoming, 
tending to make them intrinsically rational and moral.39  Nietzsche sees idealism as a 
symptom of sickness, resentment, or decadence.  He asserts that idealists invent their 
ideal realities in order to revenge themselves upon the one true world, that of 
becoming.  Thus, he writes: 
To talk about another world than this is quite pointless, provided that an 
instinct for slandering, disparaging, and accusing life is not strong within us: in 
the latter case we revenge ourselves on life by means of the phantasmagoria of 
another, a better life.40 
 
Lacking the constitution to affirm becoming, idealists express their displeasure by 
creating realms defined by stasis, mind, and blissfulness.   Conspicuously absent are 
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such integral elements to the realm of becoming as process, the body, and suffering.  
When viewed against the backdrop of a concocted ideal world, this worldthe world of 
unintelligible conflict and sufferingseems inadequate, even repulsive.   
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsches later critique of idealism finds its seminal 
form in his critique of Socrates and Euripides.  Tragedy, argues Nietzsche, died at the 
hands of this idealistic duo.  Because of his commitment to an excessively rationalistic 
and moralistic outlook, Euripides was unable to comprehend the old Aeschylean 
tragedy: 
He observed something incommensurable in every line, a certain deceptive 
distinctness and at the same time an enigmatic depth, indeed an infinitude, in the 
background.A similar twilight shrouded the structure of the drama, especially 
the significance of the chorus.  And how dubious the solution of the ethical 
problem remained to him!...How unequal the distribution of good and bad 
fortune!41   
 
Aeschylean tragedy displays a world that defies the idealists longing for intelligibility.  
Pain and suffering are distributed haphazardly.  The noble are rent asunder by 
undeserved tribulations while the evil are often left unscathed.  Hence, Euripidess 
moralistic demand for justice could not be satiated by the tragedies that Nietzsche 
preferred.  The world portrayed by these tragedies is, according to Nietzsche, a mirror of 
the world of becoming.  It is defined by conflict, injustice, and senseless suffering.  
Rather than accept that tragedy accurately depicts the nature of reality, Euripides 
constrained tragedy to present the spectator with an intelligible reality.  He went to great 
pains to explain to the spectator why the drama unfolded as it did, wishing to leave none 
of the characters actions rationally incomprehensible.  Furthermore, he sought to 
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moralize tragedy,42 which consequently came to function as a prescription for the way 
the world ought to look rather than a depiction of the way it is.  He thereby tacitly 
slandered the world of becoming, the world of Aeschylean tragedy, with the creation of 
the ideal world which he, the impostor tragedian, presented on stage. 
 Socrates, the other culprit in tragedys death, provided the theoretical framework 
that guided Euripidess production of tragedy.  Nietzsche does not limit his purview of 
Socrates detrimental influence to his historical impact upon Euripidean tragedy.  Rather, 
as he so often does with the historical figures he examines, Nietzsche employs Socrates 
as a lens through which the afflictions of modernity may be brought to light.  
Accordingly, Nietzsche does not only accuse Socrates of conspiracy in the slaughter of 
Attic tragedy; he also points out how Socrates embodiment in the 
rationalistic/moralistic outlook of modern culture acts as a barrier to the rebirth of a 
tragic culture.  Nietzsche finds historical precedent for his own modern, Socratic culture 
in Alexandrian culture.  He thus uses Alexandrian culture to highlight the poverty of his 
own culture, which he believes to be thoroughly inculcated in the Socratic faith in 
reason.  Understanding his critique of Socrates and Alexandrian culture, and how this 
critique functions as a critique of his own cultural landscape, will thus further illuminate 
his hopes for an alternative, tragic culture. 
Nietzsche claims that there are three stages of illusion designed for the more 
nobly formed natures, who actually feel profoundly the weight and burden of 
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existence.43  The first of these he describes as the Socratic love of knowledge and the 
delusion of being able thereby to heal the eternal wound of existence.44  Love of 
knowledge, the Socratic form of illusion, is foundational to Alexandrian culture.  
Nietzsche acknowledges that Alexandrian faith in knowledge is the response of a nobly 
formed nature to suffering from a world rife with pain and conflict.  Alexandrians are 
noble, one must assume, because they initially recognize that the world contains an 
abundance of suffering.  The problem Nietzsche espies with this culture is its response to 
this recognitionthat is, optimism in the limitless power of theoretical knowledge.45  
Having acknowledged the pain and suffering of existence, Alexandrian culture displays 
the unshakable faith that thought, using the thread of causality, can penetrate the 
deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even 
of correcting it.46  Alexandrian culture hubristically believes itself capable of 
ameliorating and ultimately explaining those aspects of the world that tragedy 
demonstrates to be unyielding to conceptual mastery.  Alexandrian culture thereby 
exhibits symptoms that Nietzsche later associates with idealism.  It displays faith that the 
ultimate nature of reality will be shown to be rational.  Moreover, its yearning to heal 
the eternal wounds of existence bespeaks its rejection of a world in which senseless 
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pain and suffering cannot be eliminated.  Alexandrian culture seems able to affirm life 
only insofar as reality can approximate to an ideal, rational order. 
 The German Idealist movement that dominated the philosophical landscape of 
Nietzsches time had, through the effort of Hegel, bought wholesale into the Alexandrian 
enterprise.  The philosophical project undertaken by Kant was essentially an effort to 
demonstrate the sufficiency of reason for the governance of all human activity.  But 
while Kant paid heed to the limits of theoretical reason, its role finds the broadest 
possible extension in his successor, Hegel.  For Hegel, the sovereignty of theoretical 
reason, attained in Absolute Knowing, marks the pinnacle of the activity of Spirit.  Hegel 
weds this final triumph of reason, as Dennis Schmidt observes, with the soteriological 
conviction that suffering and conflict will come to an end.47  Just as the Alexandrians 
believed themselves capable of healing the wounds of existence, so too Hegel claims 
that the wounds of Spirit heal, and leave no scars behind.48  Hegels insistence that 
reason will resolve the dissonance intrinsic to life thus allows Nietzsche to see the 
philosophical landscape he inheritsa landscape largely dominated by Hegelas 
predominantly Alexandrian.  This environment is undoubtedly not amenable to the 
exuberantly life-affirmative attitude of the Greeks.  Tragedy, Nietzsche would later 
claim, was for the Greeks a celebration of the world of becoming, even its harshest 
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elements.49  Alexandrian faith in reason, with its implicit condemnation of the astringent 
elements of reality disclosed by Aeschylean tragedy, is incapable of affirming becoming.  
To justify life in an irreparably conflicted world, Nietzsche requires an antithesis to his 
own cultures Socratic/Hegelian faith in reason.   
Apollo and Dionysus 
 Nietzsche thinks he discovers this antithesis in tragedys mysterious interweaving 
of Apollonian and Dionysian symbolism.  Therefore, it is necessary to understand what 
these symbols represent in order to grasp the profound significance of tragedy for 
Nietzsche.  Nietzsches metaphysics in The Birth of Tragedy provide perhaps the clearest 
point of departure.  Nietzsche writes that we might call Apollo himself the glorious 
divine image of the principium individuationis,50 whereas Dionysian art gives 
expression to the will in its omnipotence, as it were, behind the principium 
individuationis, the eternal life beyond all phenomena and despite all annihilation.51  
Nietzsche here, as elsewhere, expresses the difference between Apollo and Dionysus 
with Schopenhauerian metaphysical formulas.  Schopenhauer, like Kant, distinguishes 
between phenomenal and noumenal reality.  The phenomenal realm for Schopenhauer is 
the realm of individuation, while the noumenal realm is the undifferentiated, indivisible 
will.  The will as thing in itself is the wellspring of all phenomenal, individual life.  The 
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wills objectification, the phenomenal realm, is merely illusory appearance; in fact, 
Schopenhauer often likens it to a dream.  Following suit, Nietzsche associates Apollo 
with appearance, dreaming, and surfaces.52  Accordingly, Apollo governs any art form 
that deals with appearances or images.  Painting, sculpture, even lyric poetry, which 
achieves its aim by engendering vivid images in the readers mind, are among the purely 
Apollonian arts. 
 In keeping with Schopenhauers stance that the noumenal will constitutes the true 
reality behind the veil of phenomenal becoming, Nietzsche describes Dionysus as the 
primal ground of being, or the primordial unity.53  Further evincing his debt to 
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche cites music as the distinctively Dionysian form of art.  
Schopenhauer maintains that, whereas all non-musical arts simply copy phenomena, 
music is a perfect copy of the will itself.  Thus, music has the capacity to convey 
something of the depth of the enigmatic ground of being.  For Nietzsche, too, Dionysian 
music communicates truth about the intellectually unfathomable Ur-eine.  Whereas 
Apollonian art deals with appearances and images, Dionysian art may be said to capture 
something that is imagistically and conceptually incommunicable about the nature of life 
itself.  That depth which only music is capable of conveying will be explained in some 
detail later. 
 The preliminary sketch of Apollo and Dionysus provided thus far allows one to 
discern two denotations for each symbol.  Both symbols have a metaphysical denotation, 
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with Apollo signifying the phenomenal realm of individuation and Dionysus 
representing the Ur-eine.  The two symbols also have an aesthetic meaning, with Apollo 
representing the imagistic arts and Dionysus representing music.  A more detailed 
understanding of these symbols can be gained through examining how each provides a 
means to coping with the ravages of existence.  Just as Socrates illusory faith in reason 
arose as a response to suffering, so Apollo and Dionysus elicit distinctive illusions to 
combat the pain of existence.  The Apollonian illusion, Nietzsche claims, consists in 
arts seductive veil of beauty, whereas the Dionysian illusion is the metaphysical 
comfort that beneath the whirl of phenomena eternal life flows on indestructibly.54  
Paralleling his account of the link between Socrates and Alexandrian culture, Nietzsche 
provides an illuminating discussion of the connection between Apollo and Homeric 
Greek culture.  This discussion allows one to see the principle of Apollo in action, 
inspiring the generation of culture in his own peculiar way.  Nietzsche offers no similar 
discussion of the relationship he cites between Dionysus and Buddhist culture.  But since 
Homeric culture, upon Nietzsches account, arose as a response to Dionysian 
undercurrents, examining his account of its nascence will prove valuable for 
understanding Dionysus as well.     
The Apollonian culture of the Homeric Greeks, Nietzsche claims, arose as a 
response to the Greek folk wisdom of Silenus, which he quotes from Sophocless 
Oedipus at Colonus:  
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Oh, wretched, ephemeral race, children of chance and misery, why do you 
compel me to tell you what it is best for you not to hear?  What is best is utterly 
beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, to be nothing.  But the second best 
for you isto die soon.55 
 
Having faced the terror and horror of existence, the Homeric Greeks interposed 
between [themselves] and life the radiant dream-birth of the Olympians.56  As a means 
of coping with the deformed aspects of reality, they translated a perfected image of 
themselves into the heavenly realm.  They subsequently focused their attention on this 
realm, contemplating their own glory as reflected by their gods.  Nietzsche first credits 
the Homeric Greeks with overcoming the horrors of existence through the creation of 
their Olympian domain.  However, he immediately qualifies his exaggerated tone.  
Rather than having triumphed over the horror of existence, the Homeric Greeks had 
merely veiled or withdrawn [it] from sight.57  Although Nietzsche oscillates between 
describing the Apollonian prophylaxis in more robust terms as an overcoming of horror, 
and in more modest terms as a veiling of it, the latter description seems more 
appropriate.  For it was only through the most powerful and pleasurable illusions that 
the Homeric Greeks were able to combatthe wisdom of suffering.58  Only the 
illusory veiling of dissonance allowed the Homeric Greeks to defend themselves from 
the pain and suffering of existence, thereby effecting a reversal of Silenuss wisdom.  
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Rather than finding the cure for life in death, the result of the complete victory of 
Apollonian illusion, or what Nietzsche alternately calls Homeric naïveté,59 is a thirst 
for existence in the effulgence of transfigured, beautified appearance. 
The Apollonian prophylaxis against suffering does not exhibit the pitfalls of the 
Socratic response to existence.  Apollonian culture does not pretend that the reality 
confronting it is ultimately intelligible or that it can somehow mend the fractured 
character of existence.  It thereby elicits an affirmation of embodied experience that 
acknowledges important tragic limits on human experience.  Why, then, does Nietzsche 
not opt for a purely Apollonian response to existence in The Birth of Tragedy?   
There are two viable, complementary answers.  First, as Julian Young argues, the 
Homeric Greeks capacity to affirm life is predicated upon their ability to remain in a 
state of self-deception.60  They are only capable of affirming life insofar as they can 
transfigure the terrifying, grotesque aspects of existence into pulchritudinous 
appearances.  Hence, they suppress those cacophonous elements of reality that, if 
permitted to surface, would confront them with the contrived figure of their harmonic, 
Apollonian world.  The affirmation of life engendered by the Apollonian response to 
suffering thus fails to affirm unmitigated dissonance.  And, as Nietzsche later says, the 
most terrifying aspects of reality are the more powerful, more fruitful, truer sides of 
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existence, in which its will finds clearer expression.61  Since a purely Apollonian 
response to life does not brook unveiled dissonance, it cannot provide the tragic 
justification of life that Nietzsche seeks. 
Nietzsches other motivation for refusing to adopt the Apollonian response to 
suffering may very well be that he thinks an Apollonian culture cannot be sustained for 
any considerable length of time.  The Homeric Greeks self-deceptive practice of 
suppressing dissonance creates a culture that eventually must be forced to countenance 
its own falsity.  Apollonian culture will then self-destruct once the tragic wisdom it veils 
has forced its way to the fore of the cultures consciousness.  Nietzsches discussion of 
how Apollonian culture crumbled under the pressure of Dionysian undercurrents 
supports this hypothesis.  After aligning Apollo with the delimiting of the boundaries of 
the individual, as well as the principles of limit and moderation more generally,62 
Nietzsche states that, despite all the beauty and moderation of the Apollonian world, the 
Homeric Greek was forced to recognize that his entire existence rested on a hidden 
substratum of suffering and of knowledge, revealed to him by the Dionysian.63  In spite 
of the Apollonian Greeks attempt to silence this Dionysian undertone and behold only a 
transfigured world of beautified appearances, Dionysus, the principle of excess, the 
destroyer of boundaries, revealed itself as truthAnd so, wherever the Dionysian 
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prevailed, the Apollonian was checked and destroyed.64  Thus, the Apollonian veiling 
of Dionysian elements is perpetually threatened by the inability to keep those elements 
from erupting and rending the veil asunder.  A purely Apollonian culture, then, is 
constantly susceptible to destruction by Dionysian forces. 
 As mentioned above, Nietzsche offers no analysis of the interplay between 
Dionysus and Buddhist culture.  He only cites the Dionysian prophylaxis peculiar to 
Buddhist culture as metaphysical comfort.  This comfort he describes as the hope that 
the spell of individuation may be broken in augury as a restored oneness.65  
Nietzsches language of shattering the spell of individuation shows that he is 
attempting to describe the sort of escape from individuated existence promised by 
Schopenhauer in the fourth book of The World as Will and Representation and by 
Buddhist conceptions of Nirvana.  Thus, the Dionysian prophylaxis against the pain of 
existence must be hope for the negation of the discord and suffering entailed by 
individuated existence. 
 Due to Nietzsches insistence that Dionysus represents primal unity, it is 
tempting to see Dionysus as disclosing the real possibility of escape into an undivided, 
harmonious realm.  Nietzsche, however, claims that metaphysical comfort is merely 
illusory.  It is no less illusory than Apollos veil of beauty, which sustained the Homeric 
Greeks.  A distinction must be made between the illusory prophylaxis attributed to 
Dionysus and what Nietzsche believes Dionysus to truly disclose.  Nietzsche says that 
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Dionysus discloses the terror and horror of existence.  Moreover, the Dionysian vision 
is described as a glance into the abyss.66  If Dionysus is truly the harbinger of hope for 
a harmonious, painless state of unity, then Nietzsche should not make a Dionysian 
encounter seem so terrifying.  What is the truth disclosed by Dionysus from which 
Alexandrian, Homeric, and Buddhist cultures attempt to shield themselves? 
 The answer lies in that which music directly, non-conceptually conveys about the 
very nature of Dionysus himself.  Having already claimed that Dionysus represents 
primordial unity, Nietzsche asserts that this unity itself is eternally suffering and 
contradictory.67  Furthermore, the Ur-eine is suffering, primal and eternal, the sole 
ground of the world.68  According to Schopenhauer, individuation is the cause of all 
pain and suffering; whether the will itself suffers is a question not fit for finite beings.  
Breaking from Schopenhauer, Nietzsche attributes to music the power to disclose the 
truth of realitys essential dissonance.  Hence, Nietzsche writes that The Dionysian 
musician is, without any images, himself pure primordial pain and its primordial re-
echoing.69  This primordial pain is completely inaccessible to Apollonian 
consciousness.  Only the spirit of music makes encountering it possible.  Music thus 
provides a means not merely to acknowledging the suffering at the heart of existence but 
to participating in it. 
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 What does it mean to participate in Dionysian suffering?  Nietzsche describes the 
state of immersion in primordial suffering as Rausch, usually translated as intoxication 
or rapture.  The Bacchic reveler experiencing Rausch, like the Dionysian musician, is 
not conscious of the boundaries of individuation.  Instead, the Dionysian participant 
identifies with the conflicted essence of reality.  In this experience, the pains of 
individuated existence are forgone in order to participate in the suffering at the heart of 
life.  One must imagine that suffering from knowledge of ones death, from the rational 
incomprehensibility of suffering, and from the more mundane concerns of everyday 
existence is forgotten in Rausch.  Everything associated with the pains of individuation 
ceases to be felt.  Instead, one experiences oneself as belonging to universal strife.  The 
state of Rausch is one of frenzied energy and heightened attunement with the harsh 
elements of nature.  Even death and suffering, which are so harrowing from the 
individual perspective, are capable of being experienced as invigorating.  Nietzsche goes 
so far as to characterize the Dionysian experience as ecstatically joyful, as the bliss 
born of pain.70  The result of Rausch, then, is that one participates in Dionysus 
pleasure in incessant conflict, suffering, and destruction.  But human beings, either as 
conscious of themselves as individuated or as immersed in the suffering of the Ur-eine, 
cannot escape suffering.  The inescapability of pain thus constitutes the Dionysian truth 
from which even the illusory Dionysian prophylaxis of metaphysical comfort is designed 
to protect the individual. 
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 Why Dionysus discloses a terrifying truth, and then attempts to shield individuals 
from it, is never explained by Nietzsche.  He reserves one of his harshest vituperations in 
his Attempt at a Self-Criticism for his doctrine of metaphysical comfort.  What can be 
said with certainty is that Nietzsche takes Dionysian experience to be real, while 
metaphysical comfort is illusory.  If the individual believes that Dionysus promises a 
metaphysical state of painless bliss, it is only because the Dionysian Ur-eine always 
finds a way to detain its creatures in life and compel them to live on, by means of an 
illusion spread over things.71  The upshot of an authentic Dionysian experience is not 
comfort but immersion in universal suffering.  Nietzsche therefore repudiates the 
Buddhistic and Schopenhauerian promise of a painless state of harmony.  Rather, he sees 
no possibility of escape from suffering.  There are simply two ways of experiencing 
suffering: from the individual perspective or from the perspective of the Ur-eine itself.  
From the former perspective, ruination and suffering are experienced as painful and 
degrading.  From the latter perspective, one experiences them as ecstatically joyful and 
power-enhancing. 
 Since Dionysian experience is participation in the tragic essence of reality, it will 
prove to be a crucial ingredient in the tragic culture that Nietzsche hopes to inspire.  
However, a purely Dionysian culture is tough to envision, which perhaps explains why 
Nietzsche never offers an analysis of Buddhist culture.  How could a culture be built 
without the Apollonian elements of boundary and moderation functioning to check 
Dionysian destruction and excess?  Of course, the tragic culture Nietzsche wishes to 
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inspire cannot be purely Apollonian either, if it is to have any permanence.  It must 
acknowledge the Dionysian suffering at the heart of existence, or else Dionysus will 
eventually expose its falsity.  Tragedy, Nietzsche believes, can interweave Apollo and 
Dionysus so as to produce a culture that justifies individual existence, despite Dionysus 
predilection for destroying the bounds of both individuals and culture.  
The Tragic Effect 
When Nietzsche writes in retrospect that much of The Birth of Tragedy smells 
offensively Hegelian,72 he undoubtedly has in mind the dialectical interaction between 
the Apollonian and Dionysian principles.  This synthesis putatively gives rise to the 
tragic effect.  Exactly what tragedy accomplishes for Nietzsche is open to dispute.  
Young provides what is perhaps the bleakest view of the tragic effect, arguing that it 
reinforces the Schopenhauerian conclusion that individual existence is insupportable.73  
He argues that Nietzsche endorses a purely Dionysian response to existence, and that 
this response is synonymous with metaphysical comfort.  Because Young dismisses the 
role of Apollo in Nietzsches justification of life, he largely ignores the dialectical 
character of Nietzsches project.  Schacht, on the other hand, pays more attention to how 
the collaboration of Apollo and Dionysus might contribute to life-justification.  He 
attempts to demonstrate how their dialectical interweaving, upon Nietzsches account, 
elicits a life-affirmative response in the spectator.  Schacht thus describes the aim of 
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tragedy as that of helping the spectator to discern ways in which[the intractable 
aspects of the human condition]may be confronted and transformed into occasions for 
the endowment of life with grandeur and dignity.74  Schacht stresses what he sees as the 
continuity between Nietzsches early and late attempts to achieve an affirmation of 
embodied existence.  While Schacht is rightfully attentive to the dialectical nature of 
Nietzsches early attempt at life-justification, I will argue that Nietzsches early thinking 
is discontinuous with his mature attempt at life-affirmation.  What the attempted 
synthesis between Apollo and Dionysus achieves is unclear.  It seems to elicit no more 
than a cathartic effect, whereby the terror of existence disclosed by Dionysus is 
mitigated by Apollo.  This seemingly amounts to little more than an Apollonian veiling 
of Dionysian truth.  Nietzsches attempted life-justification in The Birth of Tragedy will 
consequently prove disparate from the purely Dionysian life-affirmation of his mature 
works.  In the latter, there is no hint that Dionysus must be transfigured in order for life 
to be affirmable. 
 The core of tragedy, Nietzsche explains, is Dionysian.  This epicenter originally 
consisted of nothing but a chorus of satyrs, the votaries of Dionysus and conveyors of 
the Dionysian wisdom of tragedy.75  During the enactment of the drama, the spectator, 
having been blinded to the everyday reality of culture, becomes the Dionysian man 
who contemplates his image in the chorus.76  Identifying with the chorus, the Dionysian 
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spectator now beholds a hero torn to shreds by unavoidable conflict.  But this hero is 
none other than Dionysus himself, the eternally suffering one, who appears in a variety 
of forms.77  Hence, the spectator does not merely behold a particular image of suffering 
on stage, say, that of Hamlet or Antigone.  Rather, Dionysian, universal sufferingthe 
suffering at the heart of existence itselfis portrayed by the tragic hero.  Beholding this 
suffering brings the spectator to the brink of self-resignation through the following rather 
complicated process.  While identifying with the Dionysian chorus, the bounds of self-
consciousness are transgressed. 
But as soon aseveryday reality re-enters consciousness, it is experienced as 
such, with nausea: an ascetic, will-negating mood is the fruit of these states. 
In this sense the Dionysian man resembles Hamlet: both have once 
looked truly into the essence of things, they have gained knowledge, and 
knowledge inhibits action; for their action could not change anything in the 
eternal nature of things; they feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that they 
should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint.78   
 
Thus, after glimpsing the eternally conflicted essence of reality embodied in the 
suffering of the tragic hero, the spectator is in danger of longing for a Buddhistic 
negation of the will.79  It is not during the actual experience of Dionysian identification 
that the spectator is close to self-abnegation.  Rather, upon returning to individual 
consciousness and the realm of culture, the spectator becomes paralyzed.  She has 
suffered a Dionysian vision into the eternally disjointed essence of reality, and having 
returned to self-consciousness, she is faced with nihilism.  Dionysus has laid bare the 
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truth that there is no escape from suffering for all that exists.  Now the wisdom of 
Silenus, one must imagine, resounds more stridently than ever. 
 In danger of succumbing to self-resignation, the spectator is miraculously saved: 
 Knowledge kills action; action requires the veils of illusionHere, when the 
danger to his will is greatest, art approaches as a saving sorceress, expert at 
healing.  She alone knows how to turn these nauseous thoughts about the horror 
or absurdity of existence into notions with which one can live.80   
 
In order to act in the Apollonian realm of individuation after gaining Dionysian 
knowledge, the spectator requires the veils of illusion.  Exactly what form of illusion 
Nietzsche has in mind is unclear in the passage.  He proceeds to cite the satyr chorus as 
the saving deed of Greek art,81 thereby suggesting that the Dionysian elements of the 
drama are responsible for rescuing the spectator from her morass.82  However, Nietzsche 
soon after states, Nature, as yet unchained by knowledge, with the bolts of culture still 
unbrokenthat is what the Greek saw in his satyr83  The unchaining knowledge 
which the satyr does not represent here must surely be Dionysian knowledge.  Dionysian 
knowledge is responsible for breaking the cultural boundaries established by Apollo, and 
yet the bolts of culture are here unbroken.  Hence, Nietzsche is now suggesting that the 
satyrs predominantly partake of Apollos nature.  This marks a revision of his initial 
thesis that the satyrs are purely Dionysian.  The saving principle of tragic art, therefore, 
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seems to be Apollo, the establisher of cultural boundaries and bulwarks against 
Dionysian knowledge.  This contention finds further textual support in Nietzsches 
identification of the saving illusion with the activity of veiling.  Veiling is always a 
function attributed only to Apollo.   
 To corroborate the thesis that Apollonian forces save the tragic spectator from 
self-obliteration, one can turn to Nietzsches discussion toward the end of The Birth of 
Tragedy about the relation between pure music and drama.  Having questioned how the 
spectator could persist in existence after a Dionysian encounter with the pure music of 
Tristan und Isolde, Nietzsche answers, the Apollonian tears man from his orgiastic self-
annihilation and blinds him to the universality of the Dionysian process, deluding him 
into the belief that he is seeing a single image of the world.84  Thus, it is merely a 
glorious appearance, namelyApollonian illusion whose influence aims to deliver us 
from the Dionysian flood and excess.85  Nietzsche suggests that Apollonian illusion 
shields the tragic spectator from the full thrust of Dionysian truth by transforming 
Dionysian suffering into particular images on stage.  Rather than beholding the 
universality of suffering, the spectator sees only the suffering of a noble character.  This 
suffering is beautiful, worthy of emulation, capable of justifying life.  Schacht thus 
describes the tragic effect: A new way of seeing[human existence]becomes 
possible, in that our relation to the reality that is at once the ground and the abyss in our 
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existence comes to be regarded as amenable to Apollinian transformation.86  The 
characters, the scenes on stage, the poetryin short, the conceptual and imagistic 
elements of tragic dramarescue the spectator from the terrible disclosure of Dionysus.  
The spectator, no longer mourning the universality of suffering, is restored to the realm 
of culture and now able to act in a world that is in its essence out of joint.   
 At the time of The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche believed that tragedy, upon this 
account, provided a propitious means of justifying life, despite the senseless pain and 
suffering intrinsic to individuated existence.  But Nietzsche later stridently voices his 
disapproval of the work.  What could be the reasons for his displeasure?  Nietzsche 
hoped to accomplish two things through the union of Apollo and Dionysus.  He hoped to 
provide a justification of individual existence, as well as to inspire the rebirth of tragic 
culture.  Considering the former intention, two criticisms deserve attention.  First, the 
tragic effect, as Nietzsche has explained it, seems to be catharsis of the terror evoked by 
the unmitigated dissonance encountered in Dionysian experience.  Only Apollos 
transformation of Dionysian suffering into particular images of more readily digestible 
suffering rescues the spectator for self-annihilation.  The problem with this account, for 
Nietzsches attempted tragic justification of life, is that the transformed suffering is no 
longer Dionysian suffering.  If one penetrates Nietzsches recondite, dialectical language 
about the transformation or transfiguration of Dionysus, one sees that the spectator 
acquires the capacity to persist as individual only by virtue of Apollos veiling of the 
Dionysian terror of existence.  But it is not at all clear how the truly horrific nature of the 
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Dionysian world can survive a synthesis with Apollo.  Nietzsche never shows how the 
noble heros suffering can simultaneously function as a beautiful, Apollonian image of 
particularity and as a Dionysian disclosure of the conflicted core of life.  In the end, the 
tragic spectator seems to be saved only by Apollos capacity to veil unadulterated 
Dionysian truth.  The tragic effect, therefore, seems to consist of little more than the 
purely Apollonian response to life exhibited by the Homeric Greeks.  Just as the 
Homeric Greeks needed Apollo to harness Dionysus, so too does the tragic spectator 
require the same. 
Second, what does Nietzsche mean when he says that life is justified as an 
aesthetic phenomenon?  There are two ways that one could attempt to justify individual 
existence.  The first is to appeal to its intrinsic value.  The second is to claim that an 
individual who meets some criterion is justified in existing.  Whether Nietzsche adheres 
to only one route is uncertain.  His claim that life is justified only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon could mean that all existence is intrinsically valuable, and therefore 
justified, insofar as it constitutes a sort of cosmic spectacle.  But as Young asks, to 
whom is existence then justified?87  It could only be justified to one with a cosmic 
perspective, or birds eye view, and not to individual human beings.  Strangely enough, 
Nietzsche cites this as his view of life-justification in several passages in the text.  For 
instance: 
we may assume that we are merely images and artistic projections for the true author, 
and that we have our highest dignity in our significance as works of artfor it is 
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only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally 
justified.88 
  
Nietzsche even calls the drama of human activity and history the perpetual 
entertainment of the sole author and spectator of the world.89  One must suppose that 
the cosmic perspective from which the aimless spectacle of human death and suffering 
finds justification is that of the Ur-eine.  Nietzsche is thus apparently claiming that 
individual existence is justified because the Ur-eine itself finds joy in the ceaseless ebb 
and flow of individuals.  Insofar as individuals can experience Rausch, they too can 
participate in this joy.  However, this does nothing to justify existence to individuals, 
insofar as they remain conscious of their individuality.  The suffering and pain 
experienced by any individual in an individuated state of consciousness will likely 
remain unpleasant and disturbing.  Hence, Nietzsche does not here show how his 
aesthetic justification of life can be coherent or meaningful to individual, self-conscious 
human beings. 
 Schacht discusses the second possible way in which Nietzsche may be attempting 
to aesthetically justify life.  Perhaps Nietzsche is enjoining his readers to transfigure the 
meaningless suffering in their own lives, in much the same way that tragedy shows 
Apollo transforming Dionysus.  Aesthetic justification would then mean that ones life is 
justified insofar as one is able to beautify and lend direction to ones suffering.  Hence, a 
life is justified if it meets the criterion of being the sort of aesthetic phenomenon 
embodied in the life of the tragic hero.  But if Nietzsche indeed intends to justify life this 
                                                




way, then few would be justified in existing.  While tragic heroes perhaps suffer 
beautifully, spectators of tragedy continue to confront the brunt of their own suffering as 
ignoble and haphazard.  Tragedys capacity to purge suffering of its ugliness is not a feat 
that can be faithfully and perpetually accomplished by the individual in her everyday 
encounter with the world.  Furthermore, one might imagine that even the tragic hero is 
supposed to experience her suffering as hideous and frightful; it is only the spectator of 
tragedy who finds beauty and solace in the heros response to the conflicts of life.  Even 
if one were to act the part of the tragic hero in everyday life, there is no reason to think 
that one would find life justified. 
 Precisely what Nietzsche intends by an aesthetic justification of life remains 
murky.  Whatever his intentions, one might further question, with what right can 
Nietzsche attempt to provide a justification of life?  How can existence admit of a 
discursive justification?  Nietzsches very desire to provide such justification evinces the 
complicity of The Birth of Tragedy in the Socratic/Alexandrian culture of its time.  For 
the language of justification implies that life requires a conceptual proof of its value.  
The desire for such a proof must be motivated by the drive to make the value of life 
rationally demonstrable and comprehensible.  But the task of providing a justification of 
life, as Nietzsche later seems to recognize, is fruitless and even impossible.  Thus, he 
writes: 
Judgments, value judgments concerning life, for or against, can in the last resort 
never be true: they possess value only as symptomsin themselves such 
judgments are stupiditiesFor a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life 
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thus even constitutes an objection to him, a question-mark as to his wisdom, a 
piece of unwisdom.90 
 
Nietzsche ceases to talk about justifying life in his late works, preferring instead to talk 
about affirming it.  This move apparently signals his recognition that the intrinsic value 
of life cannot be proven.  Instead of trying to work out a justification of life, Nietzsche 
sees the individuals attitude toward life as a symptom of her overall spiritual health.  
The very need to justify life signals sickness.  The ability to embrace life, to love it 
despite the impossibility of its justification, is the most telling symptom of strength.   
 Concerning Nietzsches other intention in The Birth of Tragedy, to inspire the 
rebirth of tragic culture, he never delineates how the union of Apollo and Dionysus 
contributes to the production of a tragic culture.  He only goes as far as explaining how 
the catharsis experienced by the spectator of tragedy can attenuate the pain of existence, 
thereby making life bearable.  However, a tragic culture cannot encourage its members 
to strive for a permanent condition of catharsis.  Once the cathartic effect of attending a 
tragic performance wears off, individuals are left to confront a world in which they are 
not tragic heroes.  Hence, they must undergo their own baleful pain and suffering 
without the solace attained when attending a tragedy.  Only occasional catharsis 
putatively succeeds in seducing the members to an existence rife with meaningless pain 
and suffering.  Catharsis cannot, then, be the cornerstone of a tragic culture.  Nietzsche, 
however, never suggests the tenability of an existence in which Apollo is not constantly 
active in veiling the bitter realities of life.  It therefore seems that he cannot explain how 
the members of a tragic culture could bear the Dionysian elements of life when not 
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beholding the mystical synthesis of Apollo and Dionysus on stage.  Accordingly, 
Nietzsche does not, perhaps even cannot, provide a model of the tragic culture he hopes 
to inspire.   
 Nietzsche did not remain blind to his failure to fulfill his aspirations in The Birth 
of Tragedy.  He even links his failure to his complicity in dialectic.  Nietzsche did not, 
however, envision the possibility of an affirmation of life not predicated upon the 
illusory veiling of the Dionysian realities of life for quite some time after his first work.  
As late as The Gay Science he claims that only the illusory function of art can make life 
bearable.91  In his late works, on the other hand, Nietzsche claims the capacity to 
affirm life even in its strangest and sternest problems.92  Moreover, he proclaims, 
How much truth can a spirit endure, how much truth does a spirit dare?this became 
for me the real standard of value.93  Nietzsche seems to have in mind difficult, 
Dionysian truths.  In his late conception of life-affirmation, rather than requiring Apollo 
to transfigure Dionysian, he will attempt to affirm life without recourse to palliatives.  
Nietzsches prized philosophical creation, eternal recurrence, will take center stage in his 
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CHAPTER III 
ETERNAL RECURRENCE: ELIDING AUTONOMY 
 
 
Nietzsches mature thinking about life-affirmation centers on his doctrine of 
eternal recurrence, the highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable.94  If 
interpreted as the literal recurrence of precisely the same historical pattern, eternal 
recurrence might plausibly be expected to undermine human freedom.  For everything 
that happens in the future of the present cycle is settled.  As each cycle is identical, no 
event in the future of the current cycle can differ from events in past cycles.  Thus, no 
amount of human effort can influence the only possible configuration of history.  
Despite the intuitive plausibility of this assumption about eternal recurrence, 
commentators such as Hatab and Nehamas deny that Nietzsche intends for eternal 
recurrence to undo human freedom.  In their analyses of eternal recurrence, they argue 
that Nietzsche means to underscore the necessity of the past, while leaving the future 
open to determination by free individuals.95  Individuals may be helpless to change the 
past, but the future provides a platform for the exercise of human freedom.  
Hence, eternal recurrence need not engender problems for Nietzsches praise of 
creative, heroic individuals.  In fact, Nehamas presents a reading of eternal recurrence 
that strongly emphasizes its connection with the gallantry of the self-sufficient 
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individual.  Fueled by Zarathustras approbation of the heroic individuals redemptive 
capacity, Nehamas argues that, through affirming eternal recurrence, the individual 
redeems the senselessness of human history.  Nehamas essentially sees eternal 
recurrence as an impetus to create a perfectly integrated self, whose eternal recurrence 
one can joyfully will.  By fashioning such a self, the individual redeems everything that 
made that self possible, which is the entire past.  Accordingly, the ideal Nietzschean life-
affirmers individual activity imbues the past with new meaning, even rectifying its 
previously desultory character.  It seems that what is achieved by affirming eternal 
recurrence, upon such a reading, is complete self-sufficiency.  Through a superhuman 
act of individual strength, the affirmer of eternal recurrence mends the entirety of history 
through her autonomous activity.96   
In contrast to interpretations, such as Nehamass, that see eternal recurrence as a 
vehicle for the individuals redemption of reality, I will show that Nietzsche employs 
eternal recurrence to undermine the individuals capacity for autonomous self-assertion.  
Contrary to Hatab and Nehamas, I will argue that Nietzsche does not maintain a 
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dichotomy between the necessity of the past and the openness of the future.  Instead, 
Nietzsche wants eternal recurrence to underscore the necessity of all events, past, 
present, and future.  The future, just as much as the past, stands outside the reach of the 
autonomous individuals sphere of dominance.  As mentioned in the first chapter, by 
autonomy, I intend the sort of freedom provided by agent causal accounts of free will.  
Such accounts tacitly posit a metaphysical conception of the individual, whereby the self 
is the uncaused cause of its choices and actions.  Both Hatab and Nehamas deny that 
Nietzsche holds to a metaphysical conception of the self.  However, they seem to concur 
that Nietzsche does not think the absence of such a conception of agency should change 
the way we think about individual freedom.  Hence, Hatab writes, Nietzsches 
argument seems to be that something like fate or necessity has no bearing at all on how 
we are to understand human action in practice.  Even if scientific determinism were 
demonstrably true, the openness of the future and introspective convictions about having 
real choices are phenomenological facts that cannot be explained away.97  Since Hatab 
and Nehamas continue to talk about individual freedom as if nothing changes after the 
rejection of agent causation, I will say that they support an autonomous model of 
individual action.  Both maintain that eternal recurrence only highlights the individuals 
incapacity to control the past, while leaving the future open to the prerogative of the free 
individual.   
Against their views, I think Nietzsche engages eternal recurrence to alter the way 
we understand the individual, and hence individual freedom.  Accordingly, I attempt to 
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show that Nietzsche employs eternal recurrence to undermine the way we typically think 
about human freedom.  To this end, he employs eternal recurrence as a metaphor for 
determinism in The Gay Science and Zarathustra.  Eternal recurrence thereby undercuts 
any bifurcation between the future free acts of the individual and the past events of 
history that the autonomous individual cannot control.  Consequently, affirming eternal 
recurrence requires confessing the impotence of ones autonomous will.  The individual 
can neither extend her free will to the whole of history nor rectify the past by her future 
autonomous activity.  She must rather acknowledge her powerlessness to stand against 
the accidents entailed by a deterministic cosmos. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will rely upon textual evidence from 
Nietzsches earliest works in which eternal recurrence appears, The Gay Science and 
Zarathustra.  My reason for doing so is twofold.  First, passages from these texts appear 
to offer stiff support for interpretations of eternal recurrence that see it as accentuating 
the significance of autonomous activity.  Indeed, Nehamas relies primarily upon these 
texts for his interpretation of eternal recurrence.  Second, eternal recurrence in 
Nietzsches late works acquires a more comprehensive meaning,98 which complements 
and expands its use as a metaphor for determinism in the two works examined in this 
chapter.  This meaning will be the subject of the fourth chapter.  What will emerge from 
the present examination is that confronting eternal recurrence requires countenancing the 
impotence of ones autonomous will.   
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Like Sands Through the Hourglass, Such is Your Life 
 Nietzsche first introduces eternal recurrence in a section of The Gay Science 
titled The Greatest Weight.  The reader is asked how she would react if a demon 
entered her loneliest loneliness and issued the following message:  
This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and 
innumerable times more; and there will nothing new in it, but every pain and 
every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in 
your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence
even this spider and this moonlight between the trees and even this moment and I 
myself.  The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and 
again, and you with it, speck of dust!99 
 
Nietzsche then describes two potential reactions of the listener who becomes obsessed 
with eternal recurrence.  The first is that The question in each and every thing, Do you 
desire this once more and innumerable times more? would lie upon [the listeners] 
actions as the greatest weight.100  The other reaction consists in the listeners becoming 
so well disposed to herself and to life that she desires her lifes eternal recurrence.101   
 The above passage can be construed so that it lends itself particularly well to one 
strain in Nehamass reading of eternal recurrence.  As briefly touched upon above, 
Nehamas argues that eternal recurrence functions as an impetus to self-mastery.102  He 
claims that Nietzsche propounds a literary model for the self-creators activity.  Just as 
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the perfect literary character contains no superfluous character traits and commits no 
otiose actions, the ideal Nietzschean individual meticulously chooses only actions that 
contribute to the creation of a perfectly unified self.  Nietzsche thus uses eternal 
recurrence to encourage the individual to create a fully integrated self whose eternal 
recurrence she can unabashedly will.  In keeping with Nehamass emphasis on self-
mastery, the question whether one desires the repetition of her actions innumerable times 
more has sometimes been interpreted as an ethical imperative, formulated similarly to 
Kants categorical imperative.  Deleuze, for example, claims that Nietzsche intends for 
eternal recurrence to elicit the following injunction: whatever you will, will it in such a 
way that you will its eternal return..103  Eternal recurrence thus construed encourages 
the listener to fastidiously choose her actions.  If each of her actions must recur eternally, 
then, assuming this is not a matter of indifference to her, she will likely attempt to ensure 
that none of her actions be accidental or nonessential.  That the individual must act as if 
her actions have eternal consequences thus accounts for the weightiness of the demons 
message.   
 But if the demons message functions primarily as a decision criterion, why is it 
delivered by a demon?  And why does the demon refer in his message to the listener as a 
speck of dust?  One might rejoin to the first question that a demon administers the 
message because it could cause the listener tremendous emotional duress.  Most would 
prefer to view their actions as having only fleeting significance, so that they are not 
hopelessly frustrated by their perpetual failures.  Once ones actions acquire an eternal 
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significance, however, the pressure to attain to self-perfection becomes exorbitant; 
hence, the potential crushing effect of the demons message.  Assuming that this 
explains why the message is delivered by a demon, it does not explain why the listener is 
reduced to a speck of dust.  If the listener is to henceforth approach each of her actions 
as if they have eternal significance, this must aggrandize her self-importance.  Despite 
her inability to change the past, the demons message must amplify the value of her 
future autonomous activity.  A plausible explanation that can address both questions 
requires a different interpretive strategy.   
 A viable hypothesis as to why the message is delivered by a demon is that 
Nietzsche is thinking of Socrates daimon.104  Socrates interprets his daimon as an inner 
voice, a conscience, that helps him avoid making deleterious life choices.  Socrates sees 
his daimon as a sort of metaphysical guide, mysteriously aiding him in navigating his 
way through precarious situations in life.  Contrary to Socrates, Nietzsche holds that 
civilization has produced the human conscience, which therefore does not represent a 
distinctly metaphysical aspect of the self.  In a parody of Socrates metaphysical view of 
his daimon, Nietzsche may be stressing how interpreting the demons message 
metaphysically inhibits ones vitality.  As discussed above, if one believes oneself to be 
the autonomous author of ones actions, thinking that each of ones actions will be 
eternally repeated could prove exceedingly harrowing.  One might feel infinitely 
responsible for each action one performs.  Similar to the Christian who views 
committing a single sin as deserving of eternal damnation, the individual who 
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perpetrates one act, the eternal recurrence of which she cannot will, must suffer from 
that choice eternally.  If, on the other hand, one refuses to view the demon as 
underscoring the importance of ones autonomous activity, Nietzsche might be claiming 
that ones vitality is enhanced.  So long as one views the demons message as nothing 
more than the news that all ones actions are entailed by necessity, one need not hold 
oneself metaphysically responsible for ones actions.  According to this non-
metaphysical interpretation of the demons message, the healthy response to life is to 
desire that one not be an autonomous agent.  Insofar as one desires autonomy, one would 
then experience the demons message with gnashing of teeth.  But if one can 
relinquish the metaphysical view of the self, one achieves the ultimate eternal 
confirmation and seal.  Nietzsche would not, then, be claiming that one is to act as if 
each of ones future, freely chosen actions has eternal significance.  Rather, one should 
accept ones status as a fully natural, fully determined being.  In the discussion that 
follows, this hypothesis will receive textual corroboration. 
 We can first note an ambiguity in the opening line of the demons message, This 
life as you now live it and have lived it105  Life here could refer to the span of time 
from ones birth until the present moment in which the demon delivers its message.  
Then life as you now live it would refer to the present moment, while life as you have 
lived it would refer to the past.  On the other hand, life could designate the entire 
lifespan of the listener.  In this case, life as you now live it would denote the 
individuals present lifecycle.  Life as you have lived it would then appertain to the 
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previous cycles of the exact same life.  The former interpretation fits well with 
construing eternal recurrence as an imperative.  For it provides the individual with the 
opportunity, from the present moment forward, to perform only actions that she would 
freely will to eternally recur.  The latter interpretation seemingly threatens the coherence 
of the imperative interpretation, because according to it all the details of ones life have 
already been fixed.  Every event has already been lived through innumerable times, and 
nothing can be changed this time.  If this turns out to be the more plausible interpretation 
of the demons message, then the demon is likely not informing the listener that she 
should treat her future autonomous activity as eternally significant.  Rather, the demon is 
undermining the listeners capacity to determine her own destiny through the exercise of 
her autonomous will.   
Before showing how the text more strongly supports the second interpretation of 
life as an entire lifecycle, I want to consider an objection from Hatab.  Despite holding 
to the second, literal interpretation of eternal recurrence, Hatab argues that the demons 
message is compatible with an open future in which some sort of human freedom can be 
manifested.106  Exactly what kind of freedom Hatab suggests is unclear.107  There is one 
obvious way, however, in which human freedom might be compatible with Hatabs 
literal reading of eternal recurrence.  Each action could be one that the agent has freely 
chosen innumerable times past and will choose innumerable times in the future. Thus, 
there would be only one repeating cycle of history, but it would largely be the product of 
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free choice.  The logical compatibility of eternal recurrence and autonomy is 
undoubtedly tenable.  However, imagining history literally eternally recurring as a result 
of the exact same free choices of the exact same individuals seems rather farfetched.  
Absent of some deterministic mechanism at work in the cosmos, it appears highly 
improbable that individuals would make all the same choices innumerable times without 
the slightest variation.  One must not rest content with proving the logical compatibility 
of eternal recurrence and free will.  Rather, one must ask whether the textual evidence 
suggests that the demon in The Greatest Weight propounds eternal recurrence in order 
to augment the importance of the listeners future autonomous activity?  Or does the 
demon issue the message to underscore the inability of the listener to determine her 
destiny?   
The demons language in describing the return of the minutiae of the individuals 
life is the language of necessity.  The listener is not told that her life simply will recur, 
but that she will have to live [it] once more and innumerable times more.108  And 
every detail of her life will have to return in the same succession and sequence.109  
There would be no reason for the demon to use such language if each cycle involved a 
plethora of free choices.  For it would not be true that each detail of the individuals life 
would, of necessity, recur.  Having free will means that, concerning any of an agents 
free actions, the agent has the potential to do otherwise than she actually does.  It is 
therefore true that her actions will possibly be different in future lifecycles, even if they 
                                                




turn out to be the same as a matter of fact.  Hence, even if all ones actions do turn out 
the same in every subsequent lifecycle, it is not true that each detail of ones life 
necessarily had to recur in precisely the same sequence.  Instead, it is only true that 
ones actions did in fact recur, but not of necessity.  But this is not what the demon tells 
the listener.  The demon alerts the listener that she has no control over the succession of 
events in her life, and she will remain unable to alter this necessary sequence in every 
future cycle.  If nothing can possibly change in future cycles, it can only be because the 
agent lacks the power to effect change.  Moreover, if the agent lacks that power with 
regard to future lifecycles, she also lacks it with regard to the future of the present 
lifecycle.  It thus seems implausible that the demon announces the openness of the 
agents future in this passage, so long as the passage is read literally. 
But does Nietzsche want the passage to be read as the literal repetition of the 
entire lifecycle of the individual, or only as the repetition of the stretch of time from the 
present back to ones birth?  In the former case, Nietzsche would be saying that 
everything in the listeners life, even the future, is already arranged by necessity.  In the 
latter case he would be claiming that the past is necessary, but the future might be open 
to determination by the autonomous individual.  That the former option is Nietzsches 
intention receives substantiation from the metaphor of the hourglass.  The repetition of 
the listeners life is necessitated by the perpetual overturning of the eternal hourglass of 
existence.110  When an hourglass is overturned, each grain must run its entire course 
from one end of the glass to the other at the behest of gravity.  The demon tells the 
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listener that she is tantamount to a grain of sand in an hourglass.  Just as a grain of sand 
is inexorably pulled by gravity from one side of an hourglass until it comes to rest at the 
other, so too the individuals life, from beginning to end, unfurls in a pattern over which 
she lacks any autonomous dominion.  Nietzsche intends for the listener to imagine her 
entire life unfolding deterministically in a pattern beyond her control with each new 
overturning of the hourglass.  The project of the autonomous creator, who would harness 
fate through the imposition of her will upon reality, is thus thwarted by the deterministic 
implications of eternal recurrence.   
 Hence, rather than announcing the eternal significance of the listeners actions, 
the demon reveals the impotence of her autonomous will.  So long as the listener desires 
to be the undetermined, uninfluenced author of her actions, the demons message must 
be difficult to stomach.  For her actions, just like all events in nature, are governed by 
necessity.  She lacks the capacity to extricate herself from determination by natural 
forces, a capacity which has traditionally been seen to bestow a measure of power upon 
the individual.  She is thus reduced to a speck of dust by the foul messenger of what 
must constitute, so long as she desires her autonomous will to arbitrate her destiny, 
abominable news.  One question, however, remains unanswered by this interpretation.  
That is, why should the question, Do you desire this once more and innumerable times 
more?,111 lie upon the listeners actions as the greatest weight?  The weightiness of this 
question is usually taken to be felt by the individual who has a robust amount of control 
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over her future.112  This autonomous control is accounted for by Nehamass 
interpretation of eternal recurrence, with its promise of an open future and focus on 
creativity and self-mastery.   
Let us assume that the questions weightiness is felt by the individual who 
believes her autonomous activity to be of utmost significance.  There is a textual reason 
to question linking the experience of the questions weightiness to the healthy response 
Nietzsche endorses.  Nietzsche initially describes two reactions to the demons 
messagegnashing of teeth and joy.  He then considers two consequences of the 
demons thought gaining possession of the listener.  The first is that The question in 
each and every thing, Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more? 
would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight.113  The second: Or how well 
disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more 
fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?114  Why the disjunction?  If 
Nietzsche intends for the listeners experience of the weightiness of the demons 
message (the first consequence) to be continuous with craving the confirmation and seal 
of eternal recurrence (the second consequence), why does he not instead present the two 
consequences as a conjunction?  Commentators who interpret eternal recurrence as an 
ethical imperative assume that the strength required for affirming eternal recurrence 
consists in the courageous attempt to act according to the weightiness of the demons 
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message.115   But Nietzsches use of the disjunction suggests that feeling the question as 
a burden might be the opposite of the salubrious response.  The vigorous response would 
thus actually be encapsulated by the second disjunctjoyfully craving the fulfillment of 
the demons message (and there seems to be nothing grave or weighty about such 
craving).  Allowing the demons message to bear upon ones actions as the greatest 
weight, on the other hand, is the reaction of one who gnashes her teeth upon 
encountering the demons revelation. This interpretation, which is more fully elaborated 
below, proposes that the common account of the weightiness of the question under 
consideration is fatally flawed.  For the weight is usually thought to be experienced by 
the affirmer of eternal recurrence, when in fact it is experienced by one who cannot yet 
affirm eternal recurrence.   
If, as we assumed above, the weightiness of the question is felt by the individual 
who desires autonomy, then Nietzsche is saying that such an individual will feel eternal 
recurrence as an intransigent encumbrance.  This is perfectly consistent with the 
interpretation of eternal recurrence provided thus far, according to which it impedes the 
individuals drive to autonomy.  Moreover, it is difficult for interpretations that see 
affirming eternal recurrence as a triumphant autonomous act to explain why the demons 
question should remain weighty.  According to Nehamass interpretation of eternal 
recurrence, for instance, the creative individual redeems the senselessness of history.  
But if the individual achieves such a superhuman redemption of life through willing 
eternal recurrence, it seems that affirming eternal recurrence should relieve an onus.  
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Therefore, it is difficult to link the pressure of the greatest weight to the successful 
exercise of autonomous might involved, upon Nehamass interpretation, in affirming 
eternal recurrence.  If one instead supposes that eternal recurrence obviates the ability of 
individuals to exercise their autonomous wills against necessity, it is evident that an 
individual who desires autonomy would experience the question as deadweight.  The 
demon, in asking Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more? about 
each of an individuals actions, would essentially be asking, Can you desire not to be 
the ultimate author of each of your actions?  Thus, the individual who aspires to be in 
complete control of her destiny would be apt to see the demons question as resting upon 
her actions as an immovable mass.  If she was able to relinquish her desire for 
autonomy, on the other hand, she would cease to be overburdened by the question. 
There seems to be an affinity between experiencing the demons question as the 
heaviest load and the paralysis suffered by Hamlet, according to Nietzsches description 
of him in The Birth of Tragedy.  Hamlets realization of the inefficacy of his will in the 
battle against his tragic fate lead to his incapacitation.  He realized that it was not within 
his power to set aright what necessity deemed to remain out of joint.  The demons 
message has similarly reduced the listener who desires autonomy to a weakling in the 
face of necessity.  After being so diminished, she feels overtaxed by the ineffectualness 
of her autonomous will.  In keeping with the hypothesis suggested earlier, that the 
demon in The Gay Science bears some relation to Socrates daimon, we see that 
Nietzsche has effectively reversed the Socratic interpretation of the daimon.  According 
to Nietzsche, the demon is not a metaphysical helper, but rather the bearer of the news 
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that there is nothing beyond or behind natural forces, which are governed by necessity.  
Insofar as individuals desire some degree of autonomous control over their actions, 
eternal recurrence will inevitably disappoint them.  The message conveyed by 
Nietzsches demon would in fact crush Socrates interpretation of his own daimon.  So 
long as Socrates wishes to view his daimon as a metaphysical guardian, he will not react 
joyfully to the tidings of Nietzsches demon.  For according to Nietzsches demon, 
Socrates daimon is a farce, an obstruction to Socrates acceptance that his life is the 
product of forces not subject to determination by his autonomous will.  The jubilant 
response for Nietzsche, the response that does not elicit gnashing of teeth, must instead 
be to view oneself as a completely natural beingthat is, a being with no autonomous 
control over ones actions. 
On Unredemption 
Thus far, I have attempted to show how eternal recurrence in The Gay Science 
vitiates the capacity of individuals to impose their autonomous wills upon reality.  
However, passages from Zarathustra seem strongly to contradict my hypothesis.  
Especially troubling is On Redemption, which appears to gird Nehamass connection 
between eternal recurrence and the exercise of autonomous vigor.  In this passage, 
Zarathustra is addressing a group of cripples:  
I walk among men as among the fragments of the futurethat future which I 
envisage.  And this is all my creating and striving, that I create and carry together 
into One what is fragment and riddle and dreadful accident.  And how could I 
bear to be a man if man were not also a creator and guesser of riddles and 
redeemer of accidents?116   
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Zarathustra here expresses the desire to incorporate all that has hitherto been accidental 
into a meaningful unity through his future creative activity.  He proceeds to proclaim, 
To redeem those who lived in the past and to recreate all it was into a thus I willed 
itthat alone should I call redemption.117  Thus, All it was is a fragment, a riddle, a 
dreadful accidentuntil the creative will says to it, But thus I willed it.  Until the 
creative will says to it, But thus I will it; thus shall I will it.118  The creative will thus 
strives to complete self-sufficiency, to the redemption of history by its own command. 
Zarathustra describes the past as the object of the creative wills discontent, 
because the creator cannot directly exert her will on the meaningless accidents of 
history.  Hence, Powerless against what has been done, [the creator] is an angry 
spectator of all that is past.119  The creative will can, however, bring the past within its 
sphere of dominance by willing the past as a condition of its future creative activity.  
This is what Zarathustra longs to achieve by incorporating into One what is fragment 
and riddle and dreadful accident.120  The past would then no longer be fragment, riddle, 
and dreadful accident, because its meaning would be supplied by the activity of the 
creative will.  The degree of autonomous control over reality that Zarathustra desires can 
be brought out well by a religious metaphor.  The Christian interpretation of God posited 
God as the redeemer of the world, whose redemption guarantees that the world has telos, 
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or purpose. Zarathustras speech bespeaks his desire to replace God with the autonomous 
creator.  After the death of God, the world lost its telos and thus redemption seemed 
impossible.  But the message preached by Zarathustra to the cripples is that the strong, 
creative individual can imbue the world with telos, thereby redeeming the 
meaninglessness of history in the wake of Gods death. 
Nehamas and Clark include their respective discussions of On Redemption in 
their broader examinations of eternal recurrence.121  At first glance, however, any 
relation between Zarathustras speech on redemption and eternal recurrence is difficult 
to discern.  Not only is eternal recurrence nowhere mentioned in the passage, but the 
redemption preached by Zarathustra implies a teleological vision of history, according to 
which the past is consummated in the heroic redeemers act of will.  Eternal recurrence, 
on the other hand, Nietzsche elsewhere claims to represent existence as it is, without 
meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness.122  Such a 
proclamation insinuates that no individual, no matter how strong, is capable of imparting 
a telos to reality.  What allows Nehamas to make the connection between redemption 
and eternal recurrence is his interpretation of eternal recurrence as an impetus to 
autonomous creativity.  Because Nehamas sees eternal recurrence as a spur to the sort of 
creative activity preached by Zarathustra in On Redemption, he can link the passage to 
eternal recurrence.  When Zarathustra lauds the strong individuals ability to unify the 
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fragments of history, he seems to be encouraging the individual to provide a meaning to 
the senseless past through a creative act of unification.  And precisely this creative 
activity is what Nietzsche intends to inspire through the vehicle of eternal recurrence, 
according to Nehamas. 
Despite Nehamass and others sophisticated attempts to link On Redemption 
to eternal recurrence, there are good non-textual and textual reasons alike to reject the 
former as Nietzsches teaching.  First, if we take Zarathustra to teach that the past is 
redeemed by its instrumental value for the creative individual, this redemption is 
obtained only by ignoring the future-oriented element of eternal recurrence, upon a 
literal interpretation of it.  For, history does not cease with the attempted redemptive 
affirmation of the individual.  Even if a mere mortal could successfully redeem the 
senselessness of the past, she cannot guarantee the purposefulness of the future.  She, 
along with her creative activity, will one day be pitched to the dustbin of history.  If 
affirming eternal recurrence actually requires one to affirm all history, then one must 
also affirm the future despite not knowing what riddles and accidents it will include.   
Turning to the text, we can discern several reasons for questioning whether 
Zarathustras teaching on redemption also constitutes Nietzsches teaching.  The most 
general reason is that Zarathustra propounds the teaching in Part Two of Zarathustra.  
To extract Zarathustras teaching on redemption as Nietzsches final teaching is thus to 
ignore that the denouement of Zarathustra might obviate his early teaching.  
Furthermore, in On Redemption, Zarathustra evinces self-doubt concerning his own 
teaching.  He abruptly brings his speech to a halt and looks shocked.  After returning to 
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his senses, he states, It is difficult to live with people because silence is so difficult.  
Especially for one who is garrulous.123  Although this proclamation is vague, it could 
signify Zarathustras recognition that his speech was nonsense, as T.K. Seung argues.124  
Zarathustras fear of silence forced him into a long, rambling speech that makes little 
sense.  After providing this apparent excuse for his speech, one of the cripples to whom 
the speech was addressed, a hunchback, accuses Zarathustra of speaking differently to 
his pupils than to himself.  Zarathustra offers no reply, and the hunchback gets the final 
word in On Redemption.  It seems that, as Seung perspicaciously notes, Zarathustra is 
involved in a game of masks and concealment.  While Zarathustra addresses his 
stridently heroic speech to the cripples, he does not adopt a heroic pose when he is alone.  
Hence, while he announces to others the redemptive power of the autonomous creator, 
he himself does not believe it. 
Perhaps the strongest reason for questioning the link between redemption and 
eternal recurrence is that Zarathustra has not broached eternal recurrence before On 
Redemption.  In fact, eternal recurrence does not make its official appearance until 
early in Part Three.  Even then, the remainder of Part Three of Zarathustra chronicles 
Zarathustras struggle to come to terms with eternal recurrence.  If Zarathustra views the 
upshot of eternal recurrence as already encapsulated in On Redemption, why does he 
continue to be tormented by the prospect of eternal recurrence, even after his speech 
about the redemptive power of the creative will?  It appears that the thought of eternal 
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recurrence might evoke something harrowing that Zarathustra attempts to suppress in his 
musings on redemption. 
Zarathustra the Grave 
Zarathustras first authentic attempt to face eternal recurrence does not come 
until Part Three in On the Vision and the Riddle.  He recounts a story about carrying a 
dwarf, who represents the spirit of gravity, along an ascent.  The dwarf has been 
mocking Zarathustra, reminding him that although he aspires to great heights, every 
stone that is thrown must fall.125  The dwarf then grows silent, and Zarathustra, weary 
of silence (note again that perhaps his fear of silence will cause him to say something 
nonsensical), challenges the dwarf, exclaiming: It is I or you!  But I am the stronger of 
us two: you do not know my abysmal thought.  That you could not bear!126  Zarathustra 
then announces that he has come upon two conflicting paths, one stretching backward 
for an eternity and another stretching forward for an eternity.  When asked by 
Zarathustra if he believes that these paths contradict one another, the dwarf responds 
contemptuously, All that is straight liesAll truth is crooked; time itself is a circle.127  
Zarathustra becomes infuriated, charging the dwarf with attempting to make things too 
easy for himself. 
What do the two paths represent?  And why does Zarathustra grow angry at the 
dwarfs reply to his question?  Taking up the former question, Seung observes that if one 
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path represents the past and the other represents the future, then there is no reason for 
their contradiction.  Time is a continuum, and thus the past flows seamlessly into the 
future.  Seung opts to interpret the contradiction between the two paths as the conflict 
between two types of wills.  The backward path stands for what he dubs the 
heteronomous will, or the will that submits to cosmic necessity.  In On Redemption, 
Zarathustra preached the dubious ability of the autonomous individual to redeem the 
accidents of the past.  The heteronomous will, however, acknowledges the perpetually 
accidental character of reality.  The forward path, according to Seung, represents the 
autonomous will of the creator, who wishes to overpower the heteronomous will and 
galvanize the accidents of the past for her future redemptive endeavors.128  This explains 
the conflict between the two paths. 
Let us entertain a modified version of Seungs basic hypothesis.  Accordingly, 
the backward path literally represents the past, but metaphorically the past represents 
that which does not yield to the creators autonomous will.  This is continuous with the 
role of the past in On Redemption.  The forward path literally represents the future, 
but metaphorically it represents an open stage for the autonomous individuals 
creative/redemptive endeavors.  This open stage is continuous with the sort of open 
future Nehamas sees necessary for the affirmer of eternal recurrence.  Zarathustra then 
stands at the nexus of one path that leaves his autonomous self sterile and another path 
signifying his unflagging desire to assert his autonomous virility.  His initial 
announcement of the two conflicting paths is usually interpreted as setting the stage for 
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his subsequent speech on eternal recurrence, which occurs after his rebuke of the dwarf.  
But how can two straight, contradictory paths account for the circularity of the ring of 
eternal recurrence?  Their straightness occludes their conjoining.  Now we can 
understand the dwarfs reply that All that is straight lies.129  The dwarf is accusing 
Zarathustra of propounding lies about straight paths, thus explaining his contempt for 
Zarathustras asinine question.  The dwarf is informing Zarathustra of his 
disagreementthe two straight paths do not contradict, for two straight paths do not 
exist in the first place.  After stating the doctrine of eternal recurrence tersely and, so 
argue Jung and Seung, with an ease and simple eloquence that Zarathustra will not 
duplicate, the dwarf is scolded by Zarathustra.130   
After scolding the dwarf, Zarathustra poses a series of questions to him.  It is 
vital to note that Zarathustra is not self-confident enough to provide a straightforward 
account of eternal recurrence.  He had planned to talk about two conflicting paths, but 
the dwarfs accusing Zarathustra of lying has apparently caused him to realize that his 
planned speech would have turned out to be nonsense.  Now, he is timidly attempting to 
come to terms with the dwarfs laconic pronouncement of one circular path.  Zarathustra 
begins this new speech by acknowledging the lane that leads eternally backward.  
Whatever is possible must have already been actualized on this lane.  He then ponders, 
must not all that has passed before draw after it all that is to come?131  Like its 
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function in The Greatest Weight, eternal recurrence here confronts Zarathustra as a 
metaphor for the necessity of the future.  Zarathustra is realizing that the past includes 
previous cycles of the exact same life that he is now leading and must continue to lead.  
Everything that will happen in his present lifecycle has already occurred on the 
backward lane.  Thus, Zarathustras future is fixed.  It must be just as inaccessible to 
manipulation by his autonomous will as the past.  Having initially decided to talk about 
two conflicting lanes, Zarathustra is slowly beginning to realize that whatever occurs on 
the forward lane is entailed by whatever has occurred on the backward lane.  Thus, one 
continuous circle, the movement of which is completely governed by the backward lane, 
is replacing the two conflicting lanes.  Through his questions to the dwarf, Zarathustra is 
gradually recognizing that the only reality is that which constitutes the metaphorical 
significance of the backward lane, upon the present hypothesis.  Although Zarathustra 
continues to speak of two lanes, the contents of the backward lane so obviously 
determine the contents of the forward lane that the two cease to conflict.  As Zarathustra 
slowly begins to countenance the reality of the ring of recurrence, he must be uncovering 
his own secret identity with the speck of dust of The Greatest Weight.  Just as the 
speck of dusts movement is determined by gravity, so also whatever happens to 
Zarathustra is entailed by the unchangeable past.  Thus, he becomes afraid of his 
thoughts and his speech feebly fades off.  Similar to his paralysis at the end of his speech 
in On Redemption, Zarathustra seems to suffer a similar deflation when he attempts to 
advocate the dwarfs pithy teaching.  While he is beginning to realize that his 
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autonomous will must submit to the ring of eternal recurrence, to necessity, he cannot 
yet confess his impotence.  For he cannot yet fully countenance eternal recurrence.   
One potential problem with the interpretation proffered thus far of On the 
Vision and the Riddle is that Zarathustra announces his intention to subject the dwarf to 
his abysmal thought before his initial speech on the conflicting lanes.  Since the abysmal 
thought is often interpreted as the thought of eternal recurrence, it seems plausible that 
Zarathustra was prepared to announce the doctrine of eternal recurrence from the time he 
challenged the dwarf.  His speech after rebuking the dwarf, then, should not mark a 
revision of his initially intended speech on the conflicting lanes.  Against this line of 
criticism, I suggest that Zarathustra did not yet fully understand his abysmal thought 
when he challenged the dwarf.  Moreover, he still will not admit its implications for his 
autonomy by the end of his revised speech, as evidenced by his speech-ending 
trepidation.  When Zarathustra initially challenges the dwarf, he is attempting to assert 
his autonomous will against the spirit of gravity.  Hence, his forceful claim that the 
dwarf is not capable of bearing his abysmal thought.  What Zarathustra fails to realize, 
from the issuance of his challenge until the end of his revised speech on eternal 
recurrence, is that the dwarf knows the abysmal thought.  The dwarf was able to describe 
eternal recurrence in such an unaffected manner because it is his thought, despite 
Zarathustras self-deceptive claim to the contrary. 
Thus, in On Involuntary Bliss, which follows On the Vision and the Riddle, 
Zarathustra admits that he has not yet faced his abysmal thought.  He laments:  
Alas, abysmal thought that is my thought, when shall I find the strength to hear 
you burrowing, without trembling any more?  My heart pounds to my very throat 
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whenever I hear you burrowing.  Even your silence wants to choke me, you who 
are so abysmally silent.  As yet I have never dared summon you; it was enough 
that I carried you with meYour gravity was always terrible enough for me; but 
one day I shall yet find the strength and the lions voice to summon you.132   
 
Here Zarathustra identifies his abysmal thought with the spirit of gravity that he had 
been carrying in On the Vision and the Riddle.  This identification supports the thesis 
that the dwarf is the custodian of the grave, abysmal thought.  When in On the Vision 
and the Riddle Zarathustra challenged the dwarf with his abysmal thought, he was 
initially intending to assert the power of his autonomous will over the nausea induced by 
the spirit of gravity.  To this end, he announced the two conflicting lanes in what perhaps 
would have been a speech on how the autonomous creator can reconcile the 
contradiction between the two lanes by willing the backward lane.  The initial speech 
would then have paralleled Zarathustras teaching in On Redemption.  There the past 
conflicted with the will of the creator, who mended the conflict by assimilating the past 
to her autonomous will.  In other words, Zarathustra in On Redemption taught the 
creator to overpower the necessity of the past with the future activity of her autonomous 
will; and his initial announcement of the two conflicting lanes in On the Vision and the 
Riddle insinuates that he has a similar plan.  But after the dwarf provides his forceful 
account of eternal recurrence, Zarathustra was compelled to reconsider his teaching.  
Now, in On Involuntary Bliss, Zarathustra begins to recognize his complicity with the 
spirit of gravity he had been carrying.  As we saw in On the Vision and the Riddle, the 
dwarf tells Zarathustra that he will fall back down no matter how high he casts himself.  
Although Zarathustra formerly desired to contest the dwarfs gravity with his abysmal 
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thought, he is beginning to recognize that his abysmal thought of eternal recurrence is 
synonymous with the dwarfs mocking gravity.  Truly confronting eternal recurrence 
will thus force Zarathustra to encounter the impotence of his attempt to cast himself 
high, or the impotence of his autonomous will. 
Zarathustras next and final encounter with eternal recurrence spans from The 
Convalescent until (arguably) the end of Part Three.  After summoning his abysmal 
thought, which immediately causes him to experience acute nausea, Zarathustra soon 
falls unconscious.  Upon awakening, he lies silent for seven days.  When he finally 
begins to speak to his animals, he explains that his disgust with man had choked him.  
He associates this disgust with the wisdom: All is the same, nothing is worthwhile, 
knowledge chokes.133  He then seemingly proceeds to lament the eternal return of only 
one type of man, the small man.  Clark thus argues that Zarathustras nausea stems from 
finally coming to terms with the necessity of the small mans recurrence.134  Zarathustra, 
the teacher of the Übermensch, evidently could not brook the return of his enemy before 
his seven day ordeal.  But after recovering from his paralysis, he recognizes that the 
small mans existence constitutes a necessary condition of his own existence.  If 
Zarathustra is to affirm eternal recurrence, thereby achieving the highest attainable 
affirmation of life, he must be able to will the existence even of that which repulses him. 
Nehamas, who also cites the disgust that choked Zarathustra as his abhorrence of 
the small man, describes the victory involved in affirming eternal recurrence as 
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becoming able to want to undergo again all that is cheap and detestable in the world for 
the sake of all that is not.135  It seems that, in order to achieve this triumph, Zarathustra 
must extend his autonomous will to a domain in which it was previously vacant.  
Essentially, he must be willing to say: If the small man must eternally return in order 
for me to manifest the strength required to affirm eternal recurrence, well, then I will the 
existence of even the smallest man, too!  Thus, the line of interpretation under 
consideration results in Zarathustras overpowering nausea through assimilating the 
entire world, even those things in it which previously disgusted him, to his autonomous 
will.  He no longer sees anything in the world as standing outside the sphere of his 
autonomous will.  Affirming eternal recurrence would then mean that one achieves a sort 
of absolute mastery over reality.   
However, this reading discounts the complicity between Zarathustra and the 
dwarf, as noted above.  The dwarf in On the Vision and the Riddle did not tell 
Zarathustra that, no matter how high he cast himself, small men would continue to fall 
down around him as necessary conditions of his exercise of autonomous might.  Rather, 
he prophesied Zarathustras inevitable fall.  In order to account for Zarathustras 
association with the spirit of gravity, we must reject the notion that Zarathustras 
sickness was induced by his recognition that the small mans recurrence is a prerequisite 
of his eventual triumph.  Let us instead hypothesize with Seung that Zarathustras 
recognition of his own complicity with the small man choked him.136  The text strongly 
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supports this hypothesis.  Zarathustra does not initially attribute his choking to his 
disgust with the small man.  Instead, he says his disgust with man choked him, thus 
making no distinction between small men and great men.  He then associates his disgust 
with the uniformity of all that exists, thereby insinuating the small mans affinity to the 
great man.  Thus, when Zarathustra repines, Alas, man recurs eternally!  The small 
recurs eternally!,137 he does not intend to distinguish man from the small man.  
Instead, the two are synonymous.  Hence, he continues: Naked I had once seen both, 
the greatest man and the smallest man: all-too-similar to each other, even the greatest all-
too-human.  All-too-small, the greatest!that was my disgust with man.138  Zarathustra 
is repulsed by the inability of the highest exemplars of humanity to fulfill his preaching 
in On Redemption.  Through the exercise of autonomous will, nobody, including 
Zarathustra, is capable of redeeming humanitys accidents.  Eternal recurrence dictates 
that he will eternally return to the selfsame life, thereby eternally encountering his 
failure to redeem the disjointedness of reality. 
Although a detailed discussion of the remainder of Part Three of Zarathustra is 
not possible here, the role of eternal recurrence thus far elaborated receives 
corroboration in The Other Dancing Song.  Zarathustra embroils himself in a power 
struggle with Life, attempting to submit Life with his whip.  But he is forced to 
acknowledge the inadequacy of his whip to control this unfathomable temptress.  
Perhaps Zarathustras inability to harness Life symbolically speaks to the powerlessness 
                                                




of his autonomous will.  His attempt to arrogate reality to his individual will, and thereby 
to redeem the world by his own might, has failed.  Zarathustra lacks the freedom 
required to assert himself against necessity.  So long as he desires autonomy, he must 
remain frustrated by his impotence.  Life will perpetually engender accidents that he 
cannot redress with his individual will.  Even the events of his own life, since 
determined by necessity, fall outside the terrain of his autonomous jurisdiction.  Thus, 
Zarathustra never succeeds in Part Three, perhaps cannot succeed, in fulfilling his 
preaching in On Redemption.   
The preceding examination of eternal recurrence in The Gay Science and 
Zarathustra shows that even passages often understood to support a connection between 
affirming eternal recurrence and autonomous self-assertion actually contradict such a 
link.  Instead, in these earliest works in which eternal recurrence appears, it abrogates the 
individuals capacity to autonomously control her fate.  Turning now to Nietzsches 
post-Zarathustran works, we will see that Nietzsche accords eternal recurrence a broader 
scope than is generally accounted.  It will come to serve as a metaphor for the 
inexhaustible dynamism of nature.  The task of affirming eternal recurrence will involve 














ETERNAL RECURRENCE AS A METAPHOR FOR NATURE 
 
Nietzsche explicitly links eternal recurrence to tragedy in Ecce Homo when he 
writes that eternal recurrence is the highest formula of affirmation that is at all 
attainable,139 and that the Yes-saying pathos is a tragic pathos.140  Hatab has 
recently focused on the tragic implications of affirming eternal recurrence.  He argues 
that Nietzsches primary concern is with the questions: Can meaning be found in tragic 
finitude?  If it can, what could be its measure?141  For Nietzsche, these questions can 
only be answered adequately in the light of eternal recurrence, which amounts to the 
only positive expression of meaning that is not susceptible to flinching from finite 
becoming.142  Thus, Hatab sees the affirmation of eternal recurrence not as a mere 
exhibition of psychological strength or as a simple expression of satisfaction with ones 
life.  Rather, it is a countermeasure to all forms of idealism that deprecate the world of 
becoming.  Affirming eternal recurrence means affirming finitude.  Seen in this light, 
eternal recurrence successfully achieves what Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy could 
not.  It provides an avenue by which the finite individual can affirm life in a world that is 
not intrinsically amenable to humanitys desires for intelligibility and happiness. 
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The interpretation of eternal recurrence offered below will show that I think 
Hatabs reading has merit, insofar as Nietzsche intends for affirming eternal recurrence 
to consummate his larger project of affirming becoming.  As a metaphor for the 
Dionysian character of Nature, eternal recurrence is the symbol of radical becoming.  
However, I disagree with Hatab that Nietzsche proposes a tragic vision of individual 
existence.  Tragedy is driven by the tension between individuals and natural forces.  
These forces inevitably thwart individuals efforts to impress their wills upon reality, 
thereby underscoring the limited capacity of finite individuals for self-assertion.  In order 
to maintain this tension, tragedy requires some strife between individuals and Nature.  
Nature, considered as a whole, is utterly indifferent to individuals desires and aims.  
Tragedy portrays this indomitable, squandering totality bringing even the most heroic 
individuals low.  If individuals are indeed to feel themselves tragically limited by the 
spendthrift activity of Nature, they must want to assert themselves against Nature.  
Without some measure of tension between individuals and Nature, individuals will not 
feel frustrated by Natures penchant for senseless destruction and ruination.  For the 
individual to experience finitude tragically, then, she must view Nature as something 
that often blocks [her] natural interest in happiness, preservation, knowledge, and 
purpose.143   
I will argue that Nietzsche wants us to cease viewing Nature as antagonistic to 
our individual interests.  In the previous chapter, we saw that Nietzsche employs eternal 
recurrence, in the earliest works in which it appears, to negate the individuals 
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autonomous will.  In Nietzsches post-Zarathustran works, he continues his project of 
reshaping what it means to be an individual.  Nietzsche wants to dissolve all tension 
between individuals and Nature.  He wants individuals to stop seeing themselves as 
powerful by virtue of their capacity to work against Nature.  Instead, Nietzsche enjoins 
individuals to immerse themselves in Nature.  Even the harsh elements of Nature
death, destruction, and decayare to be viewed as manifestations of the individuals 
power, not as tragic limits on individual activity.  By affirming eternal recurrence, 
Nietzsche hopes that individuals can bind themselves to Nature, thereby eliding the 
tragic tension between individuals and Nature.  Eternal recurrence will thus prove to be a 
vehicle for achieving a post-tragic view of the individual. 
Dual Perspectives: Individual Partiality and Natures Indifference 
 Nietzsche seems to acknowledge the tragic antagonism between the individual 
and Nature in the following passage:  
Imagine a being like nature, wasteful beyond measure, indifferent beyond 
measure, without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile 
and desolate and uncertain at the same time; imagine indifference itself as a 
powerhow could you live according to this indifference?  Livingis that not 
precisely wanting to be other than this nature?  Is not livingestimating, 
preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different?144   
 
Nature, here as elsewhere in Nietzsches corpus, is portrayed as an indifferent, profligate 
economy.145  Nothing more than will to power, Nature is a war zone of power centers, 
ultimately aimless and chaotic.  To be human, Nietzsches questions seem to intimate, is 
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to desire to impose ones will upon this anarchy of forces.  Nietzsche is often seen only 
as encouraging strong natures to assert their autonomous power over chaos.  Thus is 
produced a picture of the Nietzsche who champions self-mastery, artistic creativity, and 
existential struggle in a world devoid of intrinsic value.  The previous chapter should 
make us question whether such a depiction of Nietzsche accounts for his attack on 
autonomy, however.  If eternal recurrence most immediately underscores the impotence 
of autonomous activity, then we must guard against advocating such a tendentious view 
of Nietzsches thought.  There is also the Nietzsche who admits that even the strongest 
individuals count for nothing in the total economy of Nature.  This Nietzsche 
acknowledges that Natures wastefulness results in the sacrifice of its highest types.146 
Hence, even the most übermenschlich creators must countenance their powerlessness in 
the face of Natures profligate indifference.  Indeed, as we shall see, Nietzsche 
sometimes speaks as if Nature is the sole possessor of power.    
 Like Nietzsche, Schopenhauer was also troubled by the conflict between 
individual partiality and Natures indifference.  In a fascinating passage from The World 
as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer voices the difference between the individual 
and Nature as a difference between two antithetical perspectives.  Nature, says 
Schopenhauer, speaks from both the particular and the universal perspectives.  The 
former perspective is that of individuated consciousness, while the latter is that of Nature 
considered in its totality.  From the particular perspective, each individual believes itself 
to be the purpose of the entire natural order.  From this perspective, each organism 
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believes thus: I alone am all in all; in my maintenance is everything involved; the rest 
may perish, it is really nothing.147  From the universal perspective, however, the world 
is seen to teem with individuals, each of which is in itself inconsequential.  Nature thus 
speaks from the universal perspective:  
The individual is nothing and less than nothing.  I destroy millions of individuals 
every day for sport and pastime; I abandon their fate to chance, to the most 
capricious and wanton of my children, who harasses them at his pleasure.  Every 
day I produce millions of new individuals without any diminution of my 
productive power; just as little as the power of a mirror is exhausted by the 
number of the suns images that it casts one after another on the wall.  The 
individual is nothing.148   
 
Nature is here presented as a monster of creative energy, bringing forth and destroying 
its creatures in a purposeless process.  Nature itself thus represents a vicious circle of 
creativity and destruction in which the individual counts for nothing.  For Schopenhauer, 
the resolution of the antithesis between particular and universal perspectives consists in 
acknowledging the error of the particular perspectivethat of egoismand 
consequently denying ones will to live.  Adopting the universal perspective is not an 
option for the individual qua individual, since the universal perspective belongs to 
Nature itself.  Furthermore, Schopenhauer maintains that finite individuals cannot help 
but see Natures ateleological activity of bringing individuals into existence and 
stamping them out as a source of misery.  Thus, the function of the universal perspective 
is only to highlight the absurdity of the particular perspective.   
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 We are about to see that the content of eternal recurrence in Nietzsches late 
works bears a striking similarity to Nature, as depicted from Schopenhauers universal 
perspective.  Nietzsche employs eternal recurrence as a metaphor for the Dionysian 
character of Nature.  Like Schopenhauers depiction of Nature from the universal 
perspective, Dionysian Nature fecklessly creates and destroys individuals.  However, 
rather than grant Schopenhauer that the universal perspective exposes individuated 
existence as an error, Nietzsche will invite the individual to participate in the universal 
perspective. 
Da Capo Dionysus 
 The content of eternal recurrence is often taken to remain fixed throughout 
Nietzsches corpus.  In the previous chapter, I took the content of eternal recurrence in 
The Gay Science and Zarathustra to be history, precisely as it has occurred and will 
occur in every detail.  This is a fairly typical interpretation of eternal recurrences 
content.  It conveniently allows eternal recurrence to be formulated as a neat test of 
psychological health: if one can will the eternal recurrence of history with all its joys and 
sorrows, one passes the test.  However, a closer inspection of eternal recurrence in 
Nietzsches late works reveals that its content is not so easy to pin down.  And once 
pinned down, the content will be seen to be much broader than history. 
 Although Nietzsche does not explicitly refer to eternal recurrence in the 
following passage from Beyond Good and Evil, he obviously has it in mind.  He first 
claims to have had his eyes opened to the ideal of the most world affirming human being 
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through his experience with pessimism.  This is an interesting claim that will be revisited 
later.  He proceeds to describe the ideal life-affirmer:  
the ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and world-affirming human being who 
has not only come to terms and learned to get along with whatever was and is, 
but who wants to have what was and is repeated into all eternity, shouting 
insatiably da caponot only to himself but to the whole play and spectacle, and 
not only to a spectacle but at bottom to him who needs precisely this spectacle
and who makes it necessary because again and again he needs himselfand 
makes himself necessaryWhat?  And this wouldnt becirculus vitiosus 
deus?149   
 
The most world-affirming human being thus desires the eternal recurrence of the whole 
play and spectacle.  What is this entire play and spectacle?  Is it history and only 
history?   
 To see what Nietzsche means to be affirmed, we must understand that the ideal 
world-affirmer shouts da capo in three successive moments.  In the first moment, the 
content to be affirmed is oneself, presumably ones own life.  But Nietzsche immediately 
extends the scope of affirmation in the second moment.  One says yes not only to 
[oneself] but to the entire play and spectacle.  In the third moment, not only the 
spectacle but also him who needs precisely this spectacle must be affirmed.  The 
individual to be affirmed in the third moment cannot be the individual that was already 
affirmed in the third moment, as the third moment would then be entirely superfluous.150  
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150 At least it cannot be the same individual under the exact same description. 
One might object that Nietzsche could be talking about the same individual in the first 
and third moments, only under different descriptions. I do not think this is inconsistent 
with what I ultimately argue about affirming eternal recurrence. Nietzsche wants the 
human individual to effectively see Dionysian Natures joy and power as coextensive 
with her own joy and power. This would mean that in the third moment, the individual, 
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Rather, the one to be affirmed in the third moment is the one who needs the entire play 
and spectacle.  If we hypothesize that the entire play and spectacle is not just history but 
the cyclical movement of Nature, we can explain who is affirmed in the third moment.  
For who needs this spectacle?  Who is the vicious circle become god?  Nietzsche is 
probably referring to Dionysus.  Dionysus is the god whose death is but a promise of 
new life.  This explains why Nietzsche says that the object of affirmation in the third 
moment makes the spectacle necessary because he needs himself.  If Dionysus is to 
affirm himself, he must affirm both creation and destruction, both life and death.  
Dionysus self-affirmation thus demands that the play and spectacle of Natures 
desultory, cyclical activity never cease.  For Dionysus existence depends upon those 
elements of life that idealists attempt to banish from their fabricated realms of being.  
Dionysus needs death and ruination if he is to affirm his life, for without death he could 
not be rejuvenated.  Nietzsche is likely exhorting his readers to recognize that their 
existence is also predicated upon a Dionysian substratum of death and destruction.  It is 
thus in the third and final moment of affirmation that the pinnacle of life-affirmation is 
attained.  For as Nietzsche tells us, in the Dionysian symbol the ultimate limit of 
affirmation is attained.151  The individual who can affirm the Dionysian character of 
Nature thus achieves an affirmation of becoming that excludes none of the harsh 
elements of life. 
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 How exactly does the symbol of Dionysus relate to eternal recurrence?  In Ecce 
Homo, Nietzsche declares that both Dionysus and eternal recurrence encompass the 
highest limit of life affirmation.  Here, we touch upon the organic unity of Nietzsches 
thought.  He is able to interchange Dionysus and eternal recurrence so often because 
they possess nearly indistinguishable metaphorical significance.  Dionysus is the symbol 
of the eternal cyclical play of Nature,152 of becoming, and now I suggest that eternal 
recurrence functions quite similarly.  It serves as a metaphor for the necessary recurrence 
of all elements within the total economy of Nature.   
Before proceeding to examine the evidence for this contention, I want to make it 
clear that I am not denying that eternal recurrence also has history for its content.  There 
is no contradiction in holding that eternal recurrence is to be read both as the recurrence 
of history and as a metaphor for the Dionysian character of Nature.  In fact, because of 
Nietzsches repudiation of free will, it seems plausible that the currents and surges of 
Nature are wholly responsible for engendering particular historical events.  There are no 
agent causes capable of interposing their wills between Nature and history.  In the 
previous chapter, I argued that reading eternal recurrence as the literal repetition of 
history undermines the notion of autonomy.  Because one is to imagine that every event 
in ones life has already been decided, one cannot exercise autonomous control over 
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diverting. Nietzsche no longer has the same intentions, but perhaps he should have 
adjusted his language accordingly. 
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events in the present or future.  Eternal recurrence, insofar as it is a metaphor for Nature, 
will also initially bring the individual low.  It reminds the individual of her inevitable 
obsolescence, of the fact that she counts for nothing in the total economy in Nature.  It is 
only by ceding her drive to autonomy and immersing herself in Nature that the 
individual can find herself powerful. 
Eternal Recurrence and Dionysus 
 In Twilight of the Idols and Ecce Homo, Nietzsche provides extended discussions 
of the duo, eternal recurrence and Dionysus.  In the latter work, he employs Dionysus as 
a counter-symbol to Christianity, the philosophy of Schopenhauer, in a certain sense 
already the philosophy of Plato, and all of idealism as typical forms.153  As forms of 
idealism, all these targets are united by their penchant for privileging a false realm of 
being over the true world of becoming.  Viewing the domain of temporality as 
insufficient and hollow, idealists have fabricated worlds defined by stasisworlds in 
which decay, death, and suffering have been abolished.  Hence, they have indicted 
becoming, substituting mendacious lies in place of the truth.  The Dionysian Yes to 
life, on the other hand, is strictly confirmed and born out by truth and science.154  It is 
predicated upon recognition of the necessity of all aspects of existence in the total 
economy of life.  Unlike idealists, the Dionysian world affirmer says Yes even to death 
and decay.  They are just as necessary, and therefore just as valuable, as the elements of 
                                                





existence galvanized by idealists for the creation of their ideal lies.  Thus, Nietzsche 
writes:  
The affirmation of passing away and destroying, which is the decisive feature of 
a Dionysian philosophy; saying Yes to opposition and war; becoming, along with 
a radical repudiation of the very concept of beingall this is clearly more closely 
related to me than anything else thought to date.155   
 
A Dionysian affirmation of life thus requires affirming an essentially agonistic, 
dissonant world.  It involves realizing that Nothing in existence may be subtracted, 
nothing is dispensable.156   
 Where does eternal recurrence fit into the mix?  Immediately following his 
discussion of Dionysian life-affirmation, Nietzsche describes eternal recurrence as the 
doctrine of the unconditional and infinitely repeated circular course of all things.157  
As with the whole play and spectacle of Beyond Good and Evil, we are confronted 
with a vague content for eternal recurrence, namely, all things.  Given the immediately 
preceding discussion of Dionysian affirmation, it seems probable that Nietzsche is not 
restricting the content of all things to all historical events.  Instead, he intends all 
elements within the total economy of life.  Eternal recurrence encompasses the infinitely 
repeated, ateleological course of birth and death, creation and destruction.  It is the 
eternal recurrence of strife, war, and becomingprecisely those elements that are the 
hallmark of a Dionysian philosophy.  Thus, Nietzsche intends for eternal recurrence to 
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underpin the necessity of all aspects of life for Natures eternal, indifferent movement.  
This would explain Nietzsches claim that perhaps the doctrine of eternal recurrence had 
already been taught by Heraclitus.158  Heraclitus did not teach that history would 
eternally repeat itself.  Thus, if Nietzsche intends to limit the content of eternal 
recurrence to actual historical events, he has no basis for claiming that perhaps 
Heraclitus already taught the doctrine.  Instead, Nietzsche must be proposing this 
broader, Dionysian content for eternal recurrence.  Heraclitus was the one who originally 
imparted the Dionysian wisdom that all things are motivated by strife, that strife is 
necessary, and that strife is therefore justice.  Moreover, for both Heraclitus and 
Nietzsche, all things are necessary in the grand economy of the whole.  No one 
element of Nature can have privileged ontological or axiological status over its opposite.  
Nature must destroy in order to create.  Everything that idealists find repellant must exist 
in order for life to exist.  Hence, every element in the total economy of life needs its 
opposite, and the strife of these opposites must eternally recur if life is to continue.   
  A similar picture of the relation between eternal recurrence and Dionysus 
emerges toward the end of Twilight of the Idols.  Nietzsche writes:  
What did the Hellene guarantee himself with these [Dionysian] mysteries?  
Eternal life, the eternal recurrence of lifethe triumphant Yes to life beyond 
death and change; true life as a collective continuation of life through 
procreation, through the mysteries of sexuality.159   
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It is not the eternal recurrence of history with which Nietzsche concerns himself here.  
Rather, it is the eternal recurrence of life.  By life, Nietzsche says that he means the 
collective continuation of life.  Hence, he identifies true life with a trans-individual 
force, which eternally persists beneath the whirl of the generation and decay of 
individuals.  Eternal recurrence, as the eternal recurrence of life in this passage, thus 
signifies Natures perpetually incurious process of bringing individuals into existence 
and exterminating them.  Moreover, by consecrating procreation, Nietzsche is exulting 
in the eternal potency of this trans-individual force, Nature.  Christianity, on the 
contrary, with ressentiment against life in its foundationsmade of sexuality 
something impure.160  In doing so, like other forms of idealism, it slandered Nature and 
slandered life.  Nietzsche proceeds to praise the Greeks for understanding the necessity 
of pain in the total economy of life: For the eternal joy in creating to exist, for the will 
to life eternally to affirm itself, the torment of childbirth must also exist eternally.161  
Once again, Nietzsche is endorsing the Heraclitean/Dionysian view of Nature.  
Everything within the total economy of life must exist if Nature, the truly powerful, 
trans-individual force, is to continue its eternal march.  And again, Nietzsches use of the 
word eternally in the quote directly above insinuates a connection between eternal 
recurrence and the recurrence of each element within the totality of Nature.  If Nature is 
to continue its activity, even the torment of childbirth must eternally recur.   
                                                




Something that must vex proponents of the existential version of Nietzsche has 
been made explicit in the above passage.  Hatab and Nehamas, for example, read 
Nietzsche as championing the individual who manages to forge meaning or unity out of 
the raw, indifferent material of Nature.  The existential individual bravely attempts to 
assert her freedom against the looming specters of global purposelessness and her own 
encroaching demise.  But Nietzsche, at the end of Twilight of the Idols, does not laud the 
ability of courageous individuals to impose their values and wills upon Nature.  Instead, 
he defines true life as a collective continuation of life.  Nietzsche is evidently jubilating 
in the potency of a trans-individual force.  This collective force, Nature, and not the 
individual, is here seen to be the one who wields all the power; and its power is 
expressed just as much by eradicating individuals as by creating them.  Rather than 
celebrating the individual, Nietzsche again seems to be employing eternal recurrence in 
an effort to undermine the importance of the individual.  In the grand economy of 
Nature, each individual essentially amounts to nothing.  But rather than encourage finite 
individuals to wage war against the indifference of Natureto contest Natures dictum 
that the individual is inconsequentialNietzsche defines true life as the trans-individual 
power of Nature.   
Julian Young is one of the few commentators to acknowledge that Nietzsche, in 
his late works, often basks in the vigor of a trans-individual force.  Young reads 
Nietzsche, at the end of Twilight of the Idols, as admitting his inability to affirm 
individuated existence.  He has once again become a Schopenhauerian.162  Nietzsche has 
                                                
162 Julian Young, Nietzsches Philosophy of Art (New York: Cambridge 
 89
indeed perpetrated something curious.  On the one hand, his late works anticipate the 
lawgivers of the future, who will endow the post-death-of-God world with direction and 
meaning.  Without some directionality provided by strong individuals, Nietzsche worries 
that humanity might perish of nihilism.  However, eternal recurrence seems to be the 
recurrence of Natures indifferent creation and destruction of individuals.  To affirm it, 
therefore, seems to require assent that no individuals inscription of values upon reality 
is at all important.  For Nature, being wholly indifferent to the very existence of any 
individual, might capriciously stamp out the highest exemplars of humanity before they 
can even undertake their attempts at value legislation.  Nietzsche readily acknowledges 
the essential purposelessness of Nature, even revels in it: Affirmation of life even in its 
strangest and sternest problems, the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility 
through the sacrifice of its highest typesthat is what I called Dionysian, that is what I 
recognized as the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet.163  And Nietzsche is not 
here simply telling the reader what he recognized Dionysus to signify in his first work.  
Rather, he is alerting the reader that the Dionysus of The Birth of Tragedy is, by and 
large, the same Dionysus taught by the late Nietzsche, the teacher of eternal 
recurrence.164  Thus, Nietzsche ends the passage: And with that I again return to the 
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place from which I set outBirth of Tragedy was my first revaluation of all values; with 
that I again plant myself in the soil out of which I draw all that I will and canI, the last 
disciple of the philosopher DionysusI, the teacher of eternal recurrence165   
Once again, Nietzsche mentions Dionysus and eternal recurrence in the same 
breath, as if the two are inseparable.  As I have been emphasizing, this is because eternal 
recurrence is a metaphor for the Dionysian character of Nature.  Nature continues to 
manifest its power through the eternal recurrence of the same processes and every aspect 
of these processes.  Through the desultory creation and destruction of individuals, 
Nature proves that it, and it alone, is the ultimate possessor of power.  Eternal recurrence 
thereby reminds the individual of her inescapable dissolution, of her inconsequentiality 
within the total economy of Nature.  With the passage above, Nietzsches task of 
undermining the traditional notion of individual freedom and strength is complete.  And 
from the first time eternal recurrence appears until the last, it performs the destructive 
job.  In The Gay Science and Zarathustra, eternal recurrence undercut autonomy by 
obviating the individuals free will.  In those works, Nietzsche implores his readers to 
imagine their lives unfolding in patterns that have been decided without the intervention 
of their autonomous wills.  In Nietzsches late works, eternal recurrence does further 
damage to the traditional notion of individual freedom and vitality.  As a metaphor for 
the Dionysian character of Nature, eternal recurrence portrays the inexhaustible power of 
an ateleological, trans-individual force.  This force manifests its strength through the 
aimless process of creating and destroying individuals.  Collapsing the existential 
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conception of freedom, Nietzsche chooses not to celebrate the capacity of courageous 
individuals to assert their wills against Natures haphazard activity.  Instead, he revels in 
the potency of Nature, even its predilection for the destruction of the noblest individuals.  
Eternal recurrence thus highlights the impotence of individual activity, insofar as it is 
conceived as the individuals struggle against Nature. 
 One can now clearly see how eternal recurrence is related to Schopenhauers 
universal perspective of Nature.  According to the universal perspective, Schopenhauer 
depicts Nature as an ineluctably powerful and indifferent force.  This trans-individual 
force displays its vitality through the aimless creation and squandering of individuals.  
Eternal recurrence, too, now represents Natures eternal dynamism.  But for 
Schopenhauer, the universal perspective only underscores the absurdity of individuated 
existence.  If Nature cares nothing for individuals, individuation must be a mistake.  
Nietzsche, however, as the prognosticator of a life-enhancing culture, cannot capitulate 
to Schopenhauerian life-denial.  His revaluation of all values must be carried out by the 
strong individuals he envisions (or at least wishes to envision) as capable of affirming 
eternal recurrence.  This strength, as we saw in the previous chapter, cannot consist in an 
act of autonomous assertion.  One cannot succeed in extending ones autonomous will 
over all reality by simply saying to the world, thus I will it.  Exactly what kind of 
strength, then, is associated with affirming eternal recurrence? 
Experiencing Natures Inexhaustible Vitality 
 In Beyond Good and Evil, we saw that Nietzsche claimed to have had his eyes 
opened to the ideal world-affirming human being through his descent into pessimism.  
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What prompts Nietzsche to make the enigmatic claim that through grappling with 
pessimism he stumbled upon its opposite?  Nietzsche does not provide adequate textual 
evidence to permit a hypothesis based on the passage in Beyond Good and Evil alone.  
Nevertheless, a coherent account of how Nietzsche might have stumbled upon his life-
affirmative ideal through his struggle with pessimism is possible, provided the treatment 
of eternal recurrence offered thus far.  If eternal recurrence, when first introduced in The 
Gay Science, was already conceived as possessing Dionysian connotations, then 
Nietzsche would have reason to associate it with pessimism.  At the time of The Gay 
Science, he still propounded an aesthetic justification of life that relied heavily upon art 
to veil the harsh truths of life.  But just as Dionysus threatened to annihilate Apollonian 
culture in The Birth of Tragedy, so too might the Dionysian nature of eternal recurrence 
imperil the illusory artistic veils that, in The Gay Science, make life bearable.  Eternal 
recurrence would then force the young, art-adoring Nietzsche to recognize the absurdity 
of his attempt to hide the true nature of reality.  Eternal recurrence might thus have had 
the same paralyzing effect on Nietzsche as that experienced by Hamlet when he realized 
that he lacked the power to rectify reality.  Eternal recurrence in the late works could 
have a similar paralyzing effect on the individual.  Since it underscores Natures eternal 
dynamism, countenancing eternal recurrence forces the individual to acknowledge her 
own relative insignificance.  For the individual is infinitesimal in the great economy of 
life.  Nature continues its aimless activity of creation and destruction long after the 
demise of the individual.  And the individual, while alive, is ever faced with the 
realization that she is nothing but fodder for Natures pointless process of eternal 
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recurrence.  Thus, Nietzsche had good reason to initially see eternal recurrence as the 
most pessimistic of all views of the universe.166  Reality as it is, aimless creation and 
destruction, uninterrupted pain and sufferingall this is guaranteed in eternal 
recurrence.  Individual existence might justifiably seem highly unattractive in such a 
world.   
While encountering eternal recurrence might immediately cause the individual to 
bemoan her insignificance in an aimless cosmos, Nietzsche does not wish to stop there.  
Rather, he wishes to pass over to the opposite of pessimism, putatively achieved by 
affirming eternal recurrence.  What does Nietzsche mean by affirmation?  Herein 
resides the crux of Nietzsches intended solution to pessimism.  Affirmation cannot 
amount to autonomous willing.  I argued in the previous chapter that Nietzsche cannot 
envision affirming eternal recurrence as an autonomous act by which the individual 
annexes reality to her own will.  For eternal recurrence undermines autonomous 
assertion.  But another reason why affirming eternal recurrence cannot simply mean 
willing the entirety of history is that the content of eternal recurrence is not limited to 
                                                
166 Nietzsche brings out the relationship between eternal recurrence and nihilism 
quite forcefully in his notes. Since he often associates pessimism with nihilism, as both 
express the will to nothingness, a link between eternal recurrence and pessimism is also 
insinuated. See, for instance, Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), 35-36. Nietzsche 
calls the thought of Durationwithout end or aimthe most paralyzing idea. As 
aimless duration is guaranteed by eternal recurrence, Nietzsche writes, Let us think this 
thought in its most terrible form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet recurring 
inevitably without any finale of nothingness: the eternal recurrence. This is the most 
extreme form of nihilism: the nothing (the meaningless), eternally. Furthermore, in 
the notes, Nietzsche seems to think that eternal recurrence will weed out the weak
those who cannot affirm the ateleological course of Nature. These considerations 
confirm Nietzsches claim that he discovered eternal recurrence while battling 
pessimism.  
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history.  As explained in this chapter, eternal recurrence also canvasses the Dionysian 
character of Nature.  I do think it is plausible that Nietzsches ideal life-affirmer exhibits 
the readiness, or the willingness, to have history, and so also her life, eternally repeated.  
But the thesis of the previous chapter rules out seeing this willingness as an act of 
autonomous will; that is, the individual does not extend her autonomous will to the 
entirety of history and the whole of Nature by affirming eternal recurrence.   
To see what Nietzsche intends by affirmation, we can turn to his discussions of 
amor fati.  Nietzsche explains this idea:  
My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing 
to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity.  Not merely bear 
what is necessary, still less conceal itall idealism is mendaciousness in the face 
of what is necessarybut love it.167   
 
Amor fati expresses the desire that nothing in the world be different.  What is the 
content of amor fati?  What is it that one wants not to be different?  While Nietzsche 
elsewhere intimates that the lover of fate is to embrace the specific events that comprise 
her own life,168 the scope of what is to be loved seems quite broad in the above passage.  
In fact, it seems coextensive with the content of eternal recurrence.  Nietzsche juxtaposes 
amor fati and idealism, just as he sets Dionysianism against idealism.  By posing an 
antithesis between idealism and amor fati, Nietzsche is hinting that the lover of fate does 
not simply embrace history.  As an antipode to the idealist, she also embraces the whole 
of becoming, which is symbolized by Dionysian Nature.  Amor fati is thus love of both 
                                                
167 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 258. 
 
168 Ibid., 324. 
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history and Nature.  One wants nothing alterednot events in the past, present, and 
future, or anything in the total economy of life.  
Nietzsche also asserts that one is not merely to bear what is necessary.  He 
means that amor fati is not mere acceptance of reality.  One could accept that the world 
must be as it is, consent to bear it, but hate it to the core.  Less radically, one could 
acquiesce to bear reality as it is, but nevertheless either feel indifferently toward it or 
prefer that some things be different.169  But this is not what Nietzsche intends, as 
evidenced by his disavowal of merely bearing reality.  Rather, Nietzsche endorses a 
model of life-affirmation that centers on eros.  He proposes an erotic bond between the 
individual and the world.  I think what is at stake in this bond is that the individual is no 
longer to view herself in opposition to necessity or to Nature.  At the outset of the 
chapter, I discussed how Hatabs tragic conception of eternal recurrence requires some 
antagonism between the individual and Nature.  Without this tension, the individual will 
not see Nature as constraining, as placing tragic limits upon, her efforts and desires.  But 
Nietzsche wants to dissolve any such tension.  The bond of love between the individual 
and Nature is intended to close the space between the two.  No longer craving to assert 
her will against necessity or against Nature, the lover of fate sees herself united with the 
world. 
                                                
169 Clark thinks this latter option is perfectly compatible with affirming eternal 
recurrence. See Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 282. Moreover, she thinks it helps avoid the charge 
against eternal recurrence that one must consent to will morally repulsive acts. For one 
can be willing to undergo again, say, the time surrounding the murder of ones spouse, 
but still prefer that ones spouse had not been murdered. I do not think this is what 
Nietzsche intends. Rather, he enjoins his readers to love necessity, and therefore to love 
the events to which necessity gives rise. 
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Two passages from Nietzsches late works corroborate the above contention.  
The first is from the last section of Twilight of the Idols, which I have considered at 
length already in this chapter.  After reveling in the inexhaustible, profligate power of 
Nature, Nietzsche writes:  
that [collective continuation of life] is what I recognized as the bridge to the 
psychology of the tragic poet.  Not so as to get rid of pity and terror, not so as to 
purify oneself of a dangerous emotion through its vehement dischargeit was 
thus Aristotle understood it: but, beyond pity and terror, to realize in oneself 
the eternal joy of becomingthat joy which also encompasses joy in 
destruction.170   
 
Shortly after the end of this passage, Nietzsche cites himself as the votary of Dionysus 
and the teacher of eternal recurrence.  He therefore intimates that whatever he teaches in 
this passage is also what he means to teach by eternal recurrence.  As we have seen, 
Nietzsche is discussing how the collective continuation of life, or the Dionysian potency 
of Nature, inspires the creation of tragedy.  Tragedys portrayal of the perpetual 
Dionysian suffering and destruction of individuals, so Nietzsche believed in The Birth of 
Tragedy, elicits terror in the spectator.  But like Aristotle, whom he criticizes here, the 
young Nietzsche maintained that tragedy achieves its aim by catharsis.  Only the 
Apollonian veil of beauty provides the spectator with the strength not to succumb to self-
annihilation at the terror invoked by Dionysus.  However, the mature Nietzsche, now 
repudiating catharsis, teaches that the individual is not to purge herself of Dionysian 
terror.  Rather, one is to realize in oneself the eternal joy of becoming.  In other words, 
one is to realize in oneself the joy of Dionysian Nature, that joy which also 
encompasses joy in destruction.  As in the passage above concerning amor fati, 
                                                
170 Nietzsche, Twilight, 121. 
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Nietzsche here attempts to completely close the gap between the individual and Nature.  
By affirming eternal recurrence, one erotically binds oneself to that which must eternally 
recurDionysian Nature.  One ceases to view the aimless ring of human suffering and 
death as a horrifying spectacle, against which one must attempt to forge some meaning 
or unity.  Instead, one completely immerses oneself in Nature, experiencing Natures 
aimless squandering of individuals as cause for ones own joy. 
In a similar vein in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche praises Whoever does not merely 
comprehend the word Dionysian but comprehends himself in the word Dionysian.171  
Nietzsche is saying that the ideal life-affirmer does not view herself as disconnected 
from Nature.  Instead, she cannot think the word Dionysus without comprehending 
herself.  There is no space between the two.  Immediately after this passage in Ecce 
Homo, Nietzsche proceeds to cite the lines from Twilight of the Idols, quoted above, in 
which he admonishes the individual to experience in herself the eternal joy of becoming.  
Again, the Nietzschean life-affirmer is not to experience terror at Natures incessant 
creation and destruction of individuals.  Rather, affirming eternal recurrence places the 
individual beyond pity and terror.  Through experiencing the power of a trans-
individual force, Nature, in oneself, one is placed beyond the pale of the terror of 
suffering and destruction.  One even finds these formerly horrific aspects of life to be 
sources of joy.   
One might question how the individual qua individual can experience Dionysian 
Natures aimless circle of death and ruination as a source of joy.  Surely, it may seem, 
                                                
171 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 272-273. 
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the joy must belong all to Nature and not to the individual, for the individual is snuffed 
out by the eternal process of becoming.  Moreover, unlike Dionysus, the finite 
individuals death is not a promise of her own rebirth.  How, then, can the individual see 
herself as Dionysian?  Nietzsches answer, I suggest, is that the individual, through 
affirming eternal recurrence, can experience the world from Schopenhauers universal 
perspective of Nature.  We have seen how Schopenhauer personifies Nature as a monster 
of creative and destructive force, whose power is manifested by perpetually and 
capriciously bringing individuals into existence only to obliterate them.  From the 
universal perspective, all suffering, destruction, and passing away exhibit Natures 
power.  For Schopenhauer, the individual cannot partake of Natures joy in senseless 
destruction.  Being individuated means that one will find death and suffering repulsive, 
as warranting lifes condemnation.  Nietzsche, on the other hand, wants to maintain that 
one can remain individuated and yet participate in Natures inextinguishable pleasure in 
the ebb and flow of individuals.  Through binding oneself to Nature, one sees ones own 
power and joy as coextensive with Natures.  One sees the world through the totalizing 
lens of Nature.  From Natures perspective, no amount or distribution of suffering can 
indict life.  As Nietzsche says in a note, being [or Nature] is counted holy enough to 
justify even a monstrous amount of suffering.172  This further explains why Nietzsche, 
in Twilight of the Idols, describes the individual as incapable of being afflicted by 
Natures squandering proclivity.  Nature itself needs senseless suffering and destruction 
to advance its eternal procession.  Insofar as the individual can see life through the 
                                                
172 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 543. 
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perspective of Nature, there is no need to feel terror, frustration, or anxiety due to the 
preponderance of senseless suffering and decay in the world.  Rather, the individual can 
see all suffering as an enticement to life, even as an extension of her own (non-
autonomous) power.  Just as the Bacchic reveler in The Birth of Tragedy experienced 
Dionysian pain as bliss, the individual is now exhorted to experience even the harsh 
elements of Nature as cause for ecstatic exuberance.  Through participation, or 
immersion, in Natures perspective, the affirmer of eternal recurrence experiences 
complete reconciliation with Nature. 
At this juncture, it seems natural to wonder what sort of model of individuation 
Nietzsche is espousing.  It seems reasonable to suspect that the individual has been 
completely elided by her immersion in Nature.  I mentioned earlier that Young even 
questions whether Nietzsche has returned to his Schopenhauerian roots.  Drawing upon 
the last section of Twilight of the Idols, in which Nietzsche revels in the potency of a 
trans-individual force, Young argues that Nietzsche is confessing his inability to justify 
individuated existence.  I think Youngs interpretation is deficient in one sense and 
meritorious in another.  Beginning with the deficiency, it is not clear that Nietzsche 
cannot maintain some model of individuation, despite the individuals immersion in 
Nature.  For instance, Nietzsche could hold that the individual is nothing more than a 
collection of natural forces that meets some criterion of coherency.  This bundle of 
forces need not view itself as an ego, and it need not view itself as in any way opposed 
to Nature.  Whatever happens to it, happens as a result of the forces at work in, through, 
and around it.  This type of individual can have particular aims and desires; but these 
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aims and desires will be recognized as nothing more than the epiphenomena of the 
natural forces that comprise the individual.  Consider the following passage:  
Has anyone at the end of the nineteenth century a clear idea of what poets of 
strong ages have called inspiration?...one is merely incarnation, merely 
mouthpiece, merely a medium of overpowering forces.  The concept of 
revelationin the sense that suddenly, with indescribable certainty and subtlety, 
something becomes visible, audible, something that shakes one to the last depths 
and throws one downthat merely describes the facts.  One hears, one does not 
seek; one accepts, one does not ask who gives; like lightning, a thought flashes 
up, with necessity, without hesitation regarding its formI never had any 
choice.173   
 
Nietzsche clearly rejects here, as elsewhere, the notion that a substantial subject controls 
the thoughts and ideas of the self.  He describes inspiration as the feeling that one is only 
a medium of overpowering forces, not consciously guided by the individual.  Perhaps 
Nietzsche can hold some loose view of the individual as comprised by, and as a medium 
of, natural forces.  As this individual views suffering and destruction from the 
perspective of Nature, she will not wish to exact vengeance when harmed by outside 
forces.  For she will not suffer from what must occur as a result of the interplay of 
natural forces.  Nietzsche seems to exemplify this resignation to Natures necessity when 
he says of his obscurity among German readers: I myself have never suffered from all 
this: what is necessary does not hurt me; amor fati is my inmost nature.174  
Nietzsche epitomizes this love of necessity when reflecting on his own life in 
Ecce Homo.   
                                                
173 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 300. 
 
174 Ibid., 324. 
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I never even suspected what was [unconsciously] growing in meand one day 
all my capacities, suddenly ripe, leaped forth in their ultimate perfection.  I 
cannot remember that I ever tried hardno trace of struggle can be demonstrated 
in my life; I am the opposite of a heroic nature.  Willing something, striving 
for something, envisaging a purpose, a wishI know none of this from 
experience.  At this very moment I still look upon my futurean ample 
future!as upon calm seas: there is no ripple of desire.  I do not want in the least 
that anything should become different than it is; I myself do not want to become 
different.175 
 
What leaps forth from this passage is the lack of autonomous constraint required for 
Nietzsche to fulfill his lifes task.  He attempts to convince his readers that his entire life 
has organically unfolded with very little conscious control on his part.  He appears to 
have experienced his life as a fate, a destiny, guided by the trans-individual powers 
working through him.  Nietzsches assertion that he is the opposite of a heroic nature is 
also interesting in this regard.  Walter Kaufmann inserts a footnote after this claim, 
pointing out how Nietzsche might be setting himself up as an antipode to Faust.176  Since 
Faust finds redemption through his heroic striving, Nietzsche may be claiming that he 
has discovered a sort of redemption through passivity, through submission to the trans-
individual forces that govern his life.  Only by letting these forces do their workby 
ceasing to struggle against Naturehas Nietzsche succeeded in becoming who he is.   
Yet, I have obviously encountered great difficulty in trying to explicate the 
model of individuation that Nietzsche might hold.  For whatever model of individuation 
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176 Ibid., 255n. The hypothesis of Seungs work on Zarathustra is, in fact, that 
Zarathustra must come to realize that he cannot find redemption through autonomous 
assertion. He must admit that his Faustian drive is powerless. Thus, this passage, indeed 




Nietzsche is proposing, humanity has not yet reached it.  It is therefore exceedingly 
difficult even to envision it.  The merit of Youngs argument is, I think, that Nietzsche 
perhaps thinks the more traditional, tragic model of individuation, which pits the 
individual against Nature, cannot be maintained.  As Schopenhauer holds the more 
traditional model of the individual, Nietzsche may agree with Schopenhauer that 
individuation is, upon such a standard, too painful to bear.  Schopenhauer, like Hatab, 
maintains the tragic tension between individuals and Nature.  Accordingly, individuals 
cannot help but see themselves as habitually frustrated and tormented by the purposeless 
sufferings and pains entailed by Natures volatility.177  The individual will is, on 
Schopenhauers account, perpetually thwarted by the world.  Young may be correct to 
think that Nietzsche never sees individuated existence as tenable in a world where the 
tension between individuals and Nature persists unresolved.  After all, what other reason 
might Nietzsche have for proposing an erotic union between the individual and Nature?   
Of course, this question cannot admit of a conclusive rejoinder.  As it stands, 
affirming eternal recurrence does seem to result in an odd sort of insulation from pain, 
suffering, and death.  To feel even the harshest elements of existence as enticements to 
life must involve a diminishing of what one might call second-order suffering.  This is 
the sort of suffering that engenders existential reflection and perhaps inflicts the greater 
degree of psychological strain upon the individual.  For instance, worrying about ones 
death, suffering over the incomprehensibility of suffering, feeling frustrated by ones 
                                                
177 Of course, Hatab, unlike Schopenhauer, does not see this as a reason why the 
individual should not fight the good fight and attempt to forge a niche for herself in the 
world. 
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limitedness, by ones finitudeall this is encapsulated by second-order suffering.  But 
as Nietzsche states in a passage above on amor fati, he never suffered from what is 
necessary.  As Nietzsche recognizes death and senseless suffering to be necessary 
elements within the total economy of Nature, we must suppose that he is claiming never 
to have suffered from them.  The amount of first-order pain and suffering that was 
necessary for his life did not cause him grief; he did not suffer from his suffering.  He 
recognized the pointlessness of resisting his lot, of contesting the life provided him by 
Nature.  Whether this constitutes a tacit admission that individuated existence is 
unbearable, absent the bond between the individual and Nature, is both interesting and 
uncertain.  But certainly Nietzsche has attempted to outline an innovative conception, 
however difficult to discern it may be, of what it means to be individuated.  And it is my 
contention that the vehicle through which Nietzsche hopes this novel conception will 














I have argued that affirming eternal recurrence involves surrendering the 
autonomous view of the self.  The individual must confess her lack of autonomous 
control over reality and begin to see herself as powerful because she belongs to Nature.  
Hence, her power does not stem from her capacity to assert herself against Nature.  I 
have also argued that perhaps Nietzsche can maintain some model of individuation, 
according to which individuals maintain particular aims and interests, so long as the 
individual is seen as nothing more than a medium of the trans-individual forces working 
through her.  Of course, interesting work remains to be done on squaring the 
autonomous passivity involved in affirming eternal recurrence with Nietzsches praise of 
active, creative individuals.   
Contrary to the conclusion of this thesis, it is often maintained that eternal 
recurrence cannot undermine the traditional conception of the autonomous individual.  
Nehamas advocates perhaps the strongest alliance between affirming eternal recurrence 
and the traditional conception of the individual.  As we have seen, he holds that eternal 
recurrence is an impetus to fashion a perfectly integrated self whose eternal recurrence 
one can affirm.  Eternal recurrence therefore encourages the individual to create a 
unified self, over against the indifference of Nature, through the exercise of her 
autonomous will.   
I think there are a couple of problems with Nehamass interpretation that my 
reading of eternal recurrence avoids.  First, Nehamas admits that a plurality of human 
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types could construct the sort of unified life to which Nietzsche calls his readers.  
Nehamas sees this as an unavoidable result of Nietzsches perspectivism.  Numerous 
types of individuals with differing values, aims, and desires can aspire to become 
affirmers of eternal recurrence.  I do not disagree that eternal recurrence can shelter a 
plurality of types of individuals with unique values and virtues.  But I think Nehamas is 
wrong to argue that any unified individual, who wants nothing in the past to be different, 
fits Nietzsches description of the ideal life-affirmer.  Take, for instance, someone who 
fashions herself into the ideal Christian ascetic.  She exhibits the sort of perfectly unified 
personality portrayed by the characters of the worlds preeminent novels.  She despises 
her natural instincts, choosing to practice all manner of self-castigation for her perceived 
sins.  She places all hope in a heavenly realm, in which no vestige of suffering or decay 
will remain.  And yet, she is willing to affirm eternal recurrence.  For she believes, quite 
comically, that God is telling her to do so.  Would Nietzsche allow this individual to 
pass for one of his ideal life-affirmers? 
 I think the obvious answer is no.  The reason why Nehamass interpretation is 
susceptible to such obvious counterexamples is because he fails to recognize the 
connection between affirming eternal recurrence and affirming the Dionysian character 
of Nature.  Affirming eternal recurrence is only possible for those who can find all 
aspects of becoming joyful.  A plurality of human types might fit the bill, but many, if 
not most, types would also be excluded.   
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 Second, eternal recurrence can only function as a regulative ideal for Nehamas, 
who even seems to admit as much.178  If one had to create a perfectly unified self before 
affirming eternal recurrence, no one would be able to affirm it.  At best, individuals can 
only aspire to become worthy of affirming eternal recurrence upon Nehamass model.  
But while Nietzsche might pose eternal recurrence as an ideal, it is certainly not an 
unattainable regulative ideal, intended to govern autonomous human activity.  In the 
third chapter, I argued that eternal recurrence involves recognizing that ones 
autonomous control extends just as little to the future as it does to the past.  Thus, eternal 
recurrence cannot guide future autonomous creativity.  Instead, Nietzsche poses eternal 
recurrence as an ideal of life-affirmation that can be achieved by complete submission to 
necessity and to Nature.  It is not merely to be aspired to, but rather to be fulfilled by the 
individuals immersion in Nature.  Nietzsche himself does not act as if he poses eternal 
recurrence merely as a regulative ideal.  In The Gay Science, Nietzsche laments his 
inability to achieve amor fati.  He longs to one day become only a Yes-sayer.179  
However, by the time of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche announces amor fati as his inmost 
nature.180  Thus, Nietzsche does not seem to think that his ideal of life-affirmation is 
unreachable. 
                                                
178 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), 163. 
 
179 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Random House, 1974), 223. 
 
180 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo  in On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce 
Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, Random House: 1967), 324. 
 107
 We have seen that amor fati captures what Nietzsche intends by the 
affirmation of eternal recurrence.  Amor fati seems to involve total acquiescence, not 
just to the uncontrollability of the past, but to the future as well, no matter what necessity 
may determine the latter to hold.  Affirming eternal recurrence, then, seems to involve 
autonomous passivity in regard to the future.  Neither Nehamas nor Clark adequately 
explains the purely passive stance of the lover of fate.  Despite Nietzsches claim that 
amor fati means wanting nothing in the future to be differentindeed, wanting nothing 
in all eternity to be differentClark asserts that Nietzsche can intend only the past for its 
content.  Otherwise, amor fati would be completely incompatible with Nietzsches 
emphasis on change and creation.181  There is, however, no textual evidence supporting 
Clarks claim about amor fati.  If my thesis is tenable, there is no reason to think that 
passages in which Nietzsche emphasizes creativity should be given the privileged 
interpretive status Clark attributes to them.  Rather, creativity should be explained within 
the confines of the individuals immersion in Nature.  Such an explanation will 
undoubtedly prove difficult, since Nietzsche has attempted to steer us toward a new 
model of individuation.  We might not easily envisage this model due to myriad factors, 
among which are: the lack of clarity with which Nietzsche presents it; its radical 
character; even its potential inconceivability; or perhaps simply the fact that most of us 
still view individuation on a more traditional model, one that preserves some tension 
between individuals and Nature.  Whatever the reason or reasons, I think the textual 
                                                
181 Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 282. 
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evidence on eternal recurrence points toward a view of the individual as more passive, or 
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